

CURRENT *History* A MONTHLY MAGAZINE OF WORLD AFFAIRS

MARCH 1963

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FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

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April, 1963

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West Germany and East Europe

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CURRENT History

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India's dramatic conflict with Communist China has sharpened cold war tensions in South Asia. In this issue seven specialists explore the strengths and weaknesses of India's foreign policies and her internal progress. "... Economic interdependence coupled with the growing volume of intellectual and cultural collaboration . . . have undoubtedly gone a long way toward strengthening the bonds of amity and understanding between India and the United States," writes this Indian specialist, who points out also that "On the other hand, for the greater part of the last decade and a half, Indo-American relations have been troubled by serious differences of opinion between the two countries on questions of foreign policy."

Indian Non-Alignment and United States Policy

By P. C. CHAKRAVARTI

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A QUESTION WHICH was debated over and over again in the past was debated once again during the last decade or more between India and the United States: the question, whether in the dangerous world in which we live it is possible to ensure peace without defensive arrangements or whether adequate defensive arrangements are a pre-condition to the security on which peace depends. Whereas the United States has maintained the view that aggressive powers could only be kept in check by the fear of massive retaliation, India, on the contrary, stuck to the theory that it was inherently wrong to think always in terms of force, that armaments and military alliances only created tension and alarm, and that the so-called aggressive powers could be won over by patience, trust and friendship.

The Chinese invasion of India has for the

time being brought this debate to an end, for India is now persuaded that it does not always take two to make a quarrel, that there can be no peace without security and that *Panch Shila* offers no solution to the grave problems of the contemporary world. In the course of a speech to the State Information Ministers at New Delhi on October 25, 1962, Prime Minister Nehru confessed that he and his government were long living in a world of dreams, but the Chinese invasion brought them back to the world of grim realities. On November 7, speaking to the Lok Sabha, he again stated that the Chinese invasion awakened India to a new sense of realism, and this may well be "a turning-point not only in the history of India but of Asia and possibly even of the world." A few days later (December 16) Morarji Desai, India's Finance Minister, addressing a meeting of the Congress

legislators at Hyderabad, emphatically declared: "We have to make our defence forces as strong as any in the world, not to frighten any one but to defend ourselves and our freedom." One may recognise in these words an echo of what the American leaders have been saying all these years.

During the last 15 years, there were two almost opposite trends in Indo-American relations—one drawing the two great democracies of the world closer, and the other tending to draw them apart. The former stemmed from a general recognition in both the countries of their community of ideals and interests. The latter sprung from a divergence of outlook in regard to some of the crucial problems of our time, and the method and technique of dealing with them. These two trends, acting and reacting upon each other, often left Indo-American relations oscillating to and fro between two poles, as it were, and prevented them from settling down to a particular definitive course.

Among the factors which have drawn India and the United States close to each other has been a common dedication to the ideals of democracy and peace. Their approach to peace might have been different, but there has never been any suspicion in the mind of either India or the United States that the other has any designs for aggression. The Indian concept of democracy is the same as the American. The necessity of protecting democracy and enlarging human freedom is mutually recognised. India has shared with the United States a belief in the inalienable rights of man, the dignity of the individual and the rule of law. Both India and the United States are fundamentally anti-colonialist in their outlook, and in spite of some inconsequential differences of opinion concerning the character and content of colonialism and the best method of dealing with it under contemporary conditions, both have in the past given effective assistance in the transition of colonies to independent status.

There has also been a growing economic interdependence between the two countries. Before World War II, the total trade between India and the United States was valued at

\$200 million per annum; in 1954 it amounted to \$600 million; in 1961 it was roughly about \$746 million. Previously India's trade with the United States was about 7 per cent of its foreign trade; in 1954 it was nearly 20 per cent even after excluding the import of goods; this upward trend has been maintained. Moreover, in spite of differences on questions of foreign policy, the American government and people have shown deep interest in the success of India's development plans and have accepted aid to India as in the national interest. Economic and technical assistance has been made available to India on a large scale since 1951 under various programs.

In 1961, Congress approved President Kennedy's plan for consolidating principal foreign aid programs under a single Agency of International Development (A.I.D.) and since then American assistance to India has been extended principally through three agencies, viz., United States A.I.D., Public Law 480 and 665 (the Food for Peace Program) and the Export-Import Bank. The amount of that assistance now totals over \$4.425 billion and consists of both grants and loans. It is true that assistance has been received from other friendly, advanced countries (including the U.S.S.R.), but even after the development of the Aid-India Club (or Consortium), the United States has continued to be by far the biggest contributor to India's Third Five Year Plan. This economic interdependence coupled with the growing volume of intellectual and cultural collaboration made possible by the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations and the Fulbright plan have undoubtedly gone a long way towards strengthening the bonds of amity and understanding between India and the United States.

DIFFERENCES ON FOREIGN POLICY

On the other hand, for the greater part of the last decade and a half, Indo-American relations have been troubled by serious differences of opinion between the two countries on questions of foreign policy. By and large these differences were conditioned by diver-

gent national historical experience, psychological and emotional outlook, geographical position and contemporary pressures and needs. Never friendly towards communism, the United States was profoundly shocked by the conduct of the Soviet Union, communism's main citadel and principal exponent, at the end of the Second World War. The immense growth of Soviet power, the satellisation of Eastern Europe, other evidences of Soviet expansionism along with the repeated failure of negotiations to arrive at settlement of problems left over by the war produced an atmosphere of tension and strain. Under its impact the United States abandoned her traditional policy of isolationism and undertook unprecedented responsibilities in large parts of the world. In American eyes, the supreme problem of the day was to stem the tide of Soviet expansionism, and the whole of United States policy was henceforth attuned to that fundamental need.

Indians were impressed for a generation by the Soviet Union's anti-colonial propaganda and its well-publicised support for freedom movements in some Asian countries. They were remote from the atmosphere of crisis which wrought such a revolution in American mind and policy, and absorbed in the solution of their own basic socio-economic problems. They decided therefore not to toe the Western line regarding the Soviet Union but to follow a neutralist, independent policy of their own. It is this policy of neutralism or non-alignment that caused the first great misunderstanding between the United States and India. As late as December, 1956, Vice-President Nixon condemned the "brand of neutralism that makes no moral distinction between the Communist World and the free world." To this Nehru replied that he did not believe that "the world can be divided up into good and evil" and that "it is not democratic to want all people to think the same as you do."

When China went Communist in 1949, the range of difference between India and the United States covered a wider field. In American eyes the establishment of the Communist regime in China and the conclusion

of the Sino-Soviet alliance in February, 1950, heightened the threat already posed by the Soviet Union. This view was further confirmed by clear evidences of Chinese aggressiveness in Tibet, Korea and Indochina. The United States, therefore, decided not only to refuse recognition to the Chinese People's Republic and block its admission to the United Nations but also to draw a *cordon sanitaire* around it by establishing defensive bases in Korea, Formosa and Southeast Asia.

India, on the other hand, decided from the beginning to extend a hand of friendship towards the new regime. India acted on the presumption that the Communist revolution in China was a part of the great mid-century Asian resurgence and that Communist China was more Chinese than Communist. Shown consideration and good-will, the Indians thought that China, like India, would settle down to a career of peaceful internal reconstruction. For this reason, the Indian government not only recognised the new regime soon after it was inaugurated but became one of the foremost spokesmen of China's views and rights in the world forum. Year after year, in opposition to the United States' policy, India took the lead in pressuring Peking's claim to China's seat in the United Nations. When in February, 1951, a United States-sponsored resolution was moved in the United Nations General Assembly condemning Chinese aggression in Korea, India voted with the Soviet bloc against the resolution. India also strongly disapproved of the United States policy of containment of China and repeatedly pleaded for the restoration of Formosa and the off-shore islands to the Communist regime.

Another area of disagreement between India and the United States concerned the beliefs and attitudes of the two countries regarding the best way of ensuring peace and security under contemporary conditions. The United States considered the formation of such defensive alliances as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (NATO [1949]), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO [1954]), and the Baghdad Pact (1955) as of vital importance to the security of the free

world against Communist aggression. In Indian eyes such alliances were basically wrong because they tended to create "insecurity, uncertainty and instability." The West, including the United States, regarded them as "an armour but not a lance, a shield but not a sword." India viewed them as a provocation to those powers whose aggressiveness they were designed to check. Speaking in the Lok Sabha in March, 1956, Nehru described the whole approach to military pacts as "wrong," "dangerous" and "harmful." "It sets in motion," he said, "all the wrong tendencies and prevents the right tendencies from developing."

India felt particularly sore about these pacts as Pakistan was a signatory to both the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later transformed into the Central Treaty Organization [CENTO]). Nehru complained that the formation of these alliances with Pakistan as a member had brought the cold war to India's borders. "In a sense," he said, "they tend to encircle us." Indian attitude towards Pakistan resembles in some measure American attitude towards the Soviet Union. In both cases, it is an attitude of frustration, distrust and alarm, formed by past unhappy experiences and continuing unresolved tensions. In both cases, also, these tensions have sprung partly from ideological and partly from political causes. When India decided not to take sides in the Soviet-American conflict and, if possible, to attempt to bridge the gulf between the two post-war giants, she was misunderstood and resented in the United States. Similarly, when the United States decided not to take sides in the Indo-Pakistani conflict but do what she could to ease the tension between the two great non-Communist countries of South Asia, she provoked widespread criticism in India.


Most Indians believed, and to some extent even now believe, that the resentment caused by the Indian policy of non-alignment and Indian criticism of American policies on numerous occasions led the United States to lean a little too much to the side of Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir. This suspicion about American attitudes to-

wards India vis-a-vis Pakistan was further accentuated when in 1954 Pakistan entered into an arms aid agreement with the United States. Indians complained that this step would change the pattern of power relations in West and South Asia, increase Pakistan's intransigence in her dealings with her neighbours and enhance India's insecurity. It also decisively affected Indian attitude towards the Kashmir dispute. American military aid to Pakistan, said Nehru, had destroyed the "roots and foundations" of the proposed plebiscite in Kashmir; and most Indians were persuaded that the United States had ceased to be neutral in the Kashmir issue since it was now an ally of Pakistan. This pro-Pakistani leaning was often contrasted with open Soviet support to India and may have been one of the causes which made official Indian opinion so reluctant to condemn Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956.

THE LOGIC OF EVENTS

Since 1956, however, the disagreement and misunderstandings, referred to above, have lost some of their former edge, and India and the United States have been drawn a degree closer together by the sheer logic of events. The denunciation of Stalin at the Twentieth Communist Party Congress in February, 1956, the intervention of the Soviet army in the Hungarian national uprising the same year, the vicious outbursts directed against Tito by the leaders of Communist China, the execution of Imre Nagy in 1958, the brutal suppression of the Tibetan national uprising by the Chinese Communists in 1959 and the growing intrusions of the Chinese on Indian border lands all contributed to the steady disenchantment of most thinking Indians regarding Communist claims and pretensions.

On the contrary, Indians deeply appreciated American policy on the occasion of the Suez crisis in 1956, and New Delhi and Washington found it possible to cooperate with each other in its solution. At the same time, there was a better understanding of each other's viewpoints on the complex problems of international relations as a result of the Nehru-Eisenhower conference in Washington



United States Department of State Publication 7410, November, 1962.

towards the end of 1956. In a television and radio statement in Washington on December 18, 1956, Nehru stated; "I can tell you I have greatly profited by these talks. I shall treasure their memory and they will help me in many ways in my thinking." On the following day in a news conference Nehru said that his visit to Washington had revealed that the policy of the United States towards "neutralist" nations like India was "not as rigid as I thought," but "a flexible policy adapting itself to circumstances." This growing concord be-

tween India and the United States found a visible and concrete expression when President Eisenhower visited India in December, 1959. No foreign dignitary ever received a warmer popular ovation in Delhi. He was widely regarded not merely as a great soldier and a great statesman but as one who was roving the world in search of peace.

The election of John F. Kennedy as the President of the United States with Chester Bowles as one of his chief foreign policy advisers was received with satisfaction in Indian

official and unofficial circles. Both Kennedy and Bowles were known for their deep sympathy towards India and their clear recognition of the pivotal position of this country in Asian affairs. Both had recognised the far-reaching significance of the current struggle between India and China and had called for more generous economic assistance to India so that she might not lag behind China. The struggle, Kennedy emphasised, was being waged not merely on the heights of the Himalayas, but even more so on the home front; and on its issue would depend whether the underdeveloped Asian nations would prefer to travel along the free, democratic way or the totalitarian, Communist way. The appointment of Professor J. K. Galbraith, the distinguished Harvard economist, as American ambassador to India symbolised, in Indian eyes, Kennedy's deep interest and concern in India's economic well-being.

When Nehru went to Washington in November, 1961, he was hailed by President Kennedy as "a world leader of the stature of Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt." In the ensuing discussions, although there were some differences of opinion, or rather of approach, over some contemporary political issues such as testing nuclear weapons or fighting communism in South Vietnam, the two leaders found a good deal more in common. The communiqué which was issued at the end of their four-day talks concluded with the following significant words:

The Prime Minister and the President consider that their talks have been highly useful in the pursuit of their common objectives of an enduring world peace and enhanced understanding between the Governments of India and the United States. They intend to keep closely in touch with each other in the months and years ahead.

But this upward trend in Indo-American relations was not free from downward pulls from time to time. As usual, Pakistan and Kashmir continued to be a source of misunderstanding and alarm. When on January 24, 1957, the Security Council declared that any decision of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly regarding the "future shape and affiliation of the entire state or any part thereof"

would not "constitute a disposition of the state," and reaffirmed the previous resolution for a Kashmir plebiscite under U.N. auspices, it created immediate resentment in India. Serious concern was again felt in India when a defence agreement was signed between the United States and Pakistan at Ankara on March 5, 1959, although the United States government had informed the government of India that the agreement was governed by the "Eisenhower doctrine," which was limited to aggression from Communist countries.

Conversely, the United States felt great irritation at the handling of many controversial issues at the United Nations by the Indian delegation under Krishna Menon's leadership. Menon, never popular in the West or even at home, made himself particularly obnoxious in the United States by persistently equating the conduct of the United States and U.S.S.R. in regard to the violation of the nuclear test moratorium (October, 1961). The Indian action in Goa (December, 1961) also provoked widespread criticism in the United States; and Adlai Stevenson, United States resident representative at the United Nations, charged India with having committed aggression in the Portuguese enclaves.

Despite these aberrations, there is a clear community of ideals and interests between the two nations. During the recent Chinese invasion of India (October–November, 1962), Indian eyes inevitably turned towards the West for help, and the help came in an unstinting measure, particularly from Britain and the United States. This help in terms of sympathy and active support with arms and equipment, in an hour of grave national crisis, has brought India much closer to the United States than any other single event during the last 15 years. Most Indian front-rank newspapers wrote leaders under the caption,

(Continued on page 179)

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China's grievances against India may be traced to the fact that "the democratic experiment in India had not only not failed but actually gave promise of success," while "the failure of China's 'big leap' ruled out China as the economic polestar on the Asian horizon."

China: Jealous Neighbor

BY VIDYA PRAKASH DUTT

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INDIA SET out on the path of independent development in August, 1947, with a legacy of tension and conflict with one of her neighbours—Pakistan. In a parting gift of India's erstwhile rulers, the Indian sub-continent was partitioned into two states, India and Pakistan, facing each other with deep feelings of misgiving and suspicion, each believing that the other could bear its neighbor nothing but ill will. Two years later, another neighbour of India caught up with modern times, and cast its long and powerful shadow on the subcontinent. The emergence of Communist China as a unified, centralized and militarized state posed grave foreign policy questions.

How should India deal with this new power on her frontiers? Should this neighbour be treated as a potential enemy or a possible friend? Should India adopt a policy of hostility towards Communist China and thus help sow the dragon's teeth in relations with this neighbour? Was it desirable and was it in India's interests to come into conflict with this big neighbour with incalculable consequences even while India was already involved in an almost undeclared war with its other north-western neighbour? Or could India work out some method of living at

peace and avoiding permanent hostility in her relations with China?

In the search for answers to these questions the background of India's emergence into independence may be recalled. India had toiled for independence for half a century; many were the sacrifices made in this long and sharp struggle. Tempered in this conflict and, in fact, its products, the leaders of free India responded with enthusiasm to the awakening of other Asian countries. They regarded their own movement for independence as a part of the postwar ferment and resurgence in Asia, in which they took pride and pleasure. Asian unity was an objective much desired. The revolution of China was popularly considered as a link in the chain of Asian revolutions then sweeping the Asian continent. While the Indian leaders were a little uncertain about the intentions of Communist China, they were prepared and in fact hoped to treat China as an integral part of the Asian family.¹

Sentiments and wishes apart, the prospects of prolonged conflict with China could hardly be viewed with relish by any Indian government. India desperately needed peace and time for economic development and a secure base for the growth of her nascent democracy. Moreover it appeared to the Indian leaders that the emergence of Communist China had changed the international balance of power. A nation of 600 million people in close mili-

¹ See Nehru's Broadcast Talk from the B.B.C., London, January 2, 1951. *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1949-53*, The Publications Division, Delhi, 1954.

tary and ideological alliance with the Soviet Union and the rest of the Communist bloc upset the old balance and presented the world with a new major factor. It made war even more meaningless and the temper of peace even more essential.

If the revolution of China were dealt with sympathetically and if the new China were brought into the world community of nations, perhaps this revolution might find its human moorings quickly. Then India might be able to live in peace with her Himalayan neighbour. Perhaps the errors that were made in regard to the Soviet revolution could be avoided in the case of China. Both India and the world might benefit from friendship and coexistence with this new force in world politics. In the bargain India might just manage to avoid a costly and wasteful race in arms and military expenditure.

All these factors went into the making of India's China policy. (It may be noted parenthetically that Krishna Menon had little to do with the development of this policy at this particular period. Menon was at the time India's envoy in London.) Anyway, India decided to cultivate China in the hope of ensuring a peaceful neighbour and preserving peace and tranquility in Asia. Prime Minister Nehru said in a message broadcast by the United Nations radio network on May 5, 1950:

We, in India, have had two thousand years of friendship with China. We have differences of opinion and even small conflicts but when we hark back to that long past something of the wisdom of that past also helps us to understand each other. And so, we endeavour to maintain friendly relations with this great neighbour of ours, for the peace of Asia depends upon these relations.²

OVERTURES OF FRIENDSHIP

Initially, Communist China was suspicious of India and indeed all the other newly independent countries of Asia. The Communist world had not yet fully grasped the significance of the emergence of these independent nations; their doctrinal inhibitions made a

proper evaluation difficult. However, it was not long before China arrived at shrewd conclusions about India and other independent countries of Asia and started responding to their friendly overtures.

China had needs of her own. She had been drawn into a major conflict with the West and particularly the United States. She needed to break through the isolation imposed by the United States and needed friends outside the Communist bloc.

Thus relations between India and China improved. There was hope and promise of the two countries settling down to peaceful and normal development. India was aware of the fact that there could be no real, lasting solutions to any Far Eastern problems without the participation and consent of China. For this reason, India hoped to moderate China's hostility to the rest of the world, reduce China's dependence on the Soviet Union, normalize the situation in the Far East and secure a peaceful frontier along her Himalayan borderlands. China, for her part, aimed at consolidating her recent internal victories, reducing the effectiveness of the United States quarantine, and establishing the status of China as a world power. China was therefore willing to befriend India and other independent nations of Asia.

The Chinese realized that the newly independent countries had a background of conflict with the Western powers, were extremely sensitive about their hard-won freedom, and were prone to be suspicious of the Western bloc. Thus it was not difficult for Peking to promote friendly relations with most Asian and African countries and to profit by the anti-Western edge of their policies. India being the largest of these countries, friendship with India could yield the maximum results in promoting the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movement (which inevitably was anti-Western) and in particular defeating United States policies in Asia.

Communist China started giving more and more attention to friendship with India. As United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles became more and more convinced of the immorality of neutralism and showed less

² *Ibid.*, p. 133.

and less patience with it, relations between India and China became proportionately warmer. India became interested in enlarging the "peace area" (that is the non-aligned sphere); Dulles was working to contract it. Nehru wanted more and more countries to declare that they would not accept cold war groupings and divisions, that they would refuse to join a war and that they would try to restrict the area of war if one should break out.³ The United States, on the other hand, frowned at non-alignment and wanted to establish a close system of military alliances extending from the Far East and South-East Asia, through the Middle East to the North Atlantic to stop the "tidal mud" of communism. India and the United States were working at cross purposes.

The climax in this story of mutual suspicion and displeasure came when the United States decided in 1953-1954 to give massive military aid to Pakistan. The cold war had come to the borders of India and the country felt its security directly threatened because of the general belief that Pakistan had little interest in fighting communism as such but was arming herself exclusively against India.⁴

In this situation China and India inevitably came closer together. China proclaimed her support for the concept of the peace area (no doubt because she thought it would serve anti-Western ends) and insisted on India's presence in the solution of many Far Eastern problems, like Korea and Indochina. The Bandung Conference of independent Asian and African countries in April, 1955,⁵ marked the high water-mark of Indo-Chinese friendship and cooperation. This was Nehru's last and most successful effort to sell China into the Asian-African fraternity. There Chou En-lai, Prime Minister and leader of his dele-

gation, was his most gracious and charming self. While Nehru was put out by the apparent anti-communism of Mohammed Ali of Pakistan and Sir John Kotelawala of Ceylon, Chou En-lai refused to be offended by anything and was assured that many statements were made out of pique against Nehru and were not directed against China.

ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT

However, despite all these attempts by India to tame the revolution in China and foster friendship with the new Communist power along her northern frontiers, there were certain inherent elements of conflict—"contradictions," as the Chinese would say. Two big powers had appeared on the Asian scene, both proud and sensitive about their glorious past, and both spurred by deep nationalist sentiments. Nationalism allied to a fanatical, militant, proselytizing doctrine made it all the more dangerous in the case of China. China's collision with Indian nationalism was further spurred by the obsession of the leaders of Communist China with power and status.

In early 1950, China's military action in Tibet had already thrown deep shadows over the prospects of Indo-Chinese friendship. China sent her troops into Tibet and proclaimed her intention to "liberate" Tibet by force. India remonstrated and pleaded for a peaceful approach. Angrily, the Chinese asked India to mind her own business and insinuated that India must have been under foreign influence in intervening on behalf of Tibet. Indian opinion was pained and surprised but there was little that India could do in the circumstances. However, due to various internal and external considerations, China halted her march into Tibet and, urged on by India, a Tibetan delegation went to Peking to negotiate "peaceful liberation." But the whole incident was a fair premonition of things to come.

The undefined border of thousands of miles stretching from the north-eastern peaks of the Himalayas to the desolate extremity of Ladakh in the north-west constituted another element of possible conflict. From the point of view of India, the border was well-demar-

³ Nehru's Speech in the Indian Parliament on Foreign Policy, January 12, 1952. *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches*, p. 220.

⁴ Prime Minister Nehru maintained in a recent television interview with the N.B.C. that his objections to the U.S.-Pakistan military pact had been vindicated by Pakistan's response to the Chinese invasion of India.

⁵ The Bandung Conference met in Bandung, Indonesia, on April 18, 1955, and was attended by 29 independent Asian and African countries.

cated by treaty and usage, in the north-east by the much-maligned McMahon line and in the north-west by treaty between Kashmir and Tibet. The Chinese, as we shall see later, had other views and calculations. From the outset the Nehru government was anxious and concerned about the border. So far this border had been passive and dead, uninteresting, uninhabited and untended. But now with a strong power arising in China and the expansion of its influence and power in Tibet, a new situation had arisen and new dangers were posed.

India's apprehensions were particularly aroused by the fact that maps issued during the Kuomintang era showed large territories claimed and even administered by India both in the north-east and north-west as belonging to China: these maps were later republished by the new regime in China. Whenever the Indians drew the attention of the Chinese authorities to this matter, they drew the suave reply that these were old maps. The new regime had not had time to address itself to this matter, but India should have no worry on that score.

The Indian government hoped to avoid a violent conflict with Communist China over the border by softening China's suspicion of the outside world and by promoting friendship between the two countries. In April, 1954, India initialled with China a treaty on Tibet; this was a major mistake. The treaty regulated trade and cultural relations between India and the "Tibet region of China." India thus unilaterally accepted the Chinese position in Tibet without any return satisfaction over her border line with China. The Indian government thought that in this way it was ensuring implied Chinese acceptance of its frontiers. But this was a costly mistake. China got all that she wanted without having to make any formal pledge to respect India's frontiers; therefore China could claim that she had not agreed to India's position on the border. A little duplicity and a little double talk could easily strengthen China's legal position.

Thus India endeavoured in every possible way to make peace with China and to normal-

ize the relations between China and the non-Communist world. But in this self-imposed mission India failed to get any cooperation from the United States. Therefore her efforts were doomed, for unless the basic hostility between China and the United States could be moderated there was little hope of real normalization of China's role in the world. At the Bandung Conference, Chou En-lai was persuaded to agree to direct negotiations with the United States but Dulles though willing to talk was not prepared to buy any scheme of the Afro-Asians for rapprochement with the Chinese Communists. It is one of the tragic ironies of contemporary history that by the time the former United States administration pulled itself away from the dangerous fascination for brinkmanship, the Chinese Communists had switched over to a fanatical adherence to this policy.

MILITANT COMMUNISM

By 1958, China had performed an about-face in her foreign policy, and lost all interest in peaceful coexistence. She talked and breathed fire, apparently willing to take the whole world in her stride. Both internally and externally China adopted dogmatic policies and prided herself on being a militant Communist country. Internal conditions, the stage of economic development, the requirements of national interests as Peking saw them—all these produced a reappraisal of foreign policy; a new hard, uncompromising, line emerged. China got into an increasingly bitter controversy with the Soviets because the Chinese were afraid that Khrushchev would make a deal with the United States which would not suit them. The return of Formosa to Peking, admittance into the select few of the Security Council's permanent members, recognition as one of the great powers of the world, the lifting of the United States embargo and encirclement—these and other policy objectives of Peking could not possibly be guaranteed by any detente between the United States and the Soviet Union—and therefore Peking had no interest in Soviet-American agreement.

At the same time the Chinese Communists

reconsidered the role of the neutrals and some of their old fascination wore off. Their usefulness to the Socialist camp was questioned and it was thought that the time had come to get tough. In Peking's doctrinal terminology the "bourgeois" leaders of these countries were compromising their neutralism more and more in favour of the "imperialists," in particular the United States. It was no mere coincidence that within a short span of two years (1958-1960) the Chinese came into conflict over some issue or other with Yugoslavia, the United Arab Republic, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal and India one after the other. Although they did a clever job of fence-mending and contained their disputes, there was no real retreat from their basic assumptions and objectives. As the largest of the non-aligned countries, India had to pay a specially heavy penalty in China's "war" against the world.

Soon there were other scores to settle with India. While Mao and his colleagues were getting angrier and angrier with Tito and Khrushchev and Eisenhower and were reshaping their policies, a revolt in Tibet broke out which left them angry with Nehru. The Tibetan revolt in early 1959 resulted in the flight of the Dalai Lama and thousands of other Tibetans into India and evoked deep emotions in India where historical and cultural ties with Tibet had been very intimate. The Indian people were deeply aroused over ruthless suppression in Tibet and the Chinese Communists were enraged over the asylum given to the Tibetan refugees and India's sympathies with the Dalai Lama and his followers. The Tibetan developments left a harvest of bitter grapes on both sides of the Himalayas.

For the first time, the Chinese formally and officially questioned the validity of the entire border between India and China, and in September, 1959, Chou En-lai laid claims to large chunks of territory which India had been proclaiming as her own. Even before that, in 1957, the Chinese had surreptitiously built a strategic road, known as the Aksai

Chin road, through the territory claimed by India, linking two of their sensitive, border provinces—Sinkiang and Tibet. But now Peking served official notice of her claims of 35,000 square miles in the north-east and over 12,000 square miles in the north-west of Indian territory. These claims were in accord with the maps that Peking had continued to publish while assuring India that these were old maps which the Chinese authorities had not had time to revise.

In his letter of September 8, 1959, to Nehru, Chou En-lai claimed that the border between India and China had never been demarcated and insisted that in settling this question the "historical background of British aggression in China when India was under British rule" must be taken into account.⁶ He challenged the legality of the McMahon line which India claimed had settled the north-east border. The McMahon line was drawn in 1911 by a high British official; it demarcated on the map the border line between Tibet and India. This line was reconfirmed by Tibet and the British at the time of the Simla Convention in 1914 which was attended by representatives of the British, Tibet and China. The Chinese representatives initialled the agreements at the Convention, which also fixed the borders between Tibet and China, but the Chinese government did not ratify the agreement. Peking now takes refuge in the fact that no Chinese government ratified the agreement and that the borders were fixed by "British imperialism."

The Indian stance is that historical records show conclusively that the refusal of the Chinese government to ratify the Simla Convention agreements had no relation whatsoever to the McMahon line. As for the argument about British imperialism, New Delhi asserted that China's frontiers and claims were also the product of imperialism and that Chinese imperialism could claim no higher ethical validity than British imperialism. Moreover, the border line under discussion was not an artificial line but followed a natural geographical division, including well marked watersheds and mountain passes between Tibet and India.

⁶ For the text of Chou En-lai's letter see *Peking Review*, No. 37, September 15, 1959, pp. 6-9.

AN OFFICIAL REPORT

A raging border conflict now developed between India and China. Positions hardened and the spirit of compromise evaporated. Only one serious attempt was made to negotiate the dispute. As a result of Chou En-lai's visit to India in April, 1960, the officials of the two countries met first in Peking and then in New Delhi to study the border in its historical setting, with documents and maps. The result was a voluminous report to the two governments in which each side stated its own respective case without reaching any agreement.⁷

The report of the officials was a revealing document for in it India's case emerged with such force and historical validity that the government of India took immediate steps to publish it. The Chinese were disturbed and dismayed. They had not anticipated this result and they suppressed the report. When finally they did acknowledge it publically they printed only portions from their own case. At the same time, Chinese attacks on India became shrill, political diatribes.⁸

It was evident, if proof was really needed, that Peking was using the border dispute as a cat's paw in the political struggle that it was conducting in its foreign policy—a struggle that encompassed a wide range, from the United States to Yugoslavia, from Nehru to Khrushchev. Mao was not overly bothered with border lines—he was more concerned in fighting his political adversaries—or those whom he regarded as enemies around the globe. The McMahon line disturbed only Taipeh (which has been making pathetic gestures to bask in the reflected glory of Peking's nationalist expansion); it did not disturb Mao, for he had recognized that line in the

case of Burma. But, since politics took command of all, a favourite dictum of Mao, he would not oblige India because he had other political objectives.

It is true, as many British scholars and journalists have noted, that the Chinese Communists have been concerned about their Ladakh road and that with their recent invasion of India they served notice that their presence and power in the Himalayas must be accepted. However, if this were their only aim an invasion of India was not required. No one can seriously suggest that India had any military strength to recover the road from the Chinese or to dislodge them from the positions they had occupied in Ladakh. All the moves that India took there were designed to fortify India's existing position and to prevent further infiltration. If Peking wanted merely to secure her position in Ladakh all that she had to do was to sit pretty. But the border conflict was in fact part of Mao's political gamble.

China's changing attitude towards the neutrals and the angry exchanges over Tibet have been noted earlier. In fact, Peking's "grievances" against India went much deeper. India had done a little too well for China's liking and the democratic experiment in India had not only not failed but actually gave promise of success. India progressed slowly but surely. Population increased in India by about 2 per cent per year but agricultural production was going up by 4.5 per cent. Not too high a rate of progress and yet not too slow either.

In industrial production also the expansion might have been slower than that of the Chinese but it was still substantial and meaningful. The failure of Peking's "big leap" ruled out China as the economic polestar on the

(Continued on page 179)

⁷ For a complete picture of the case of the two sides on the border alignment the official report published by the Government of India should be studied. Also consult the White Papers published by the Government of India between 1959 and 1961.

⁸ That China is using the border dispute as a political conflict with India is clear from Chinese writings on the subject. See, for instance, People's Daily editorial, "More on Nehru's Philosophy." Full text in *Peking Review*, No. 44, November 2, 1962, pp. 10-22.

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Discussing India's relations with the Soviet Union, this scholar points out that "... as Chinese-Indian relations deteriorated sharply, Soviet-Indian relations showed an upward trend. During this period, the Soviet Union declared its virtual neutrality on the Indian-Chinese border conflict ... but a studied attempt was made by both sides to demonstrate the continued friendship between India and the Soviet Union."

India and the Soviet Union

By SISIR GUPTA

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IN ONE of his public speeches during his visit to India in 1955, Nikita Khrushchev said:

We are your friends and not only in good weather when the sun is shining pleasantly. We are your friends in any weather, and if a breeze or draft should ever blow which is harmful to the health of the Indian people, remember us and we shall never forget you.¹

There may not be many in India who would credit the Soviet leader with having come to their help when the northern hurricane blew over India in late 1962, but others have blamed or credited Khrushchev with just that. Albanian Communist Premier Mehmet Shehu virtually declared that in the Indian-Chinese conflict real Marxist-Leninists were up against the combined forces of "Indian reactionaries," "world imperialists" and "modern revisionists,"² and an American correspondent stationed in Moscow, Mervin Kalb of the CBS, held that faced with a choice between India

and China, Khrushchev had leaned towards India.³

Such controversial views apart, when the Assistant Secretary of State of the United States says that it may be good both for India and the West that she maintain her friendly relations with the U.S.S.R.,⁴ there is obviously more in that relationship than a mere case history of a naive new nation duped by the never changing Soviet state which aspires to dominate the rest of the world. In fact, the development of friendly relations between India and the U.S.S.R. in the last few years may be one of those phenomena which not only do not fit in with the somewhat oversimplified structure of bloc rivalry as the dominating feature of the world politics of the present decade but also may indicate the emergence of profound changes in the pattern of international relations. Although the first contacts between India and the U.S.S.R. occurred against the backdrop of the cold war maneuverings in the Asian region, there is some indication that more and deeper factors have been at work to lend new meaning to Indo-Soviet friendship.

For one thing, Indians and Russians have become more aware of their common problem—living in peace with a militarised and militaristic China. For another, with the expansion of the global role of the

¹ Speech at Agra; summarised text in "Current Digest of the Soviet Press," VII, 47, 4 Jan. 1956.

² Speech of November 28, 1962, as broadcast by the Albanian Radio.

³ Comments at a public meeting at Cambridge, Mass., on December 16, 1962.

⁴ Mr. Harriman expressed his view in a television interview on December 9, 1962. For a very interesting elaboration of this view see editorial entitled "Looking For Trouble" in "The Washington Post," December 17, 1962.

U.S.S.R. on the one hand, and the shift in emphasis within the Soviet Union to a degree of attention to the welfare of the Soviet citizen, on the other, conditions have been created for a more realistic assessment of the stupendous problem that countries like India pose to the powerful and developed nations of the world.

There is no doubt that in some degree the Soviet and Indian conceptions of their national interests coincided. While Soviet motivations in developing close relations with India may no longer be a mystery, enigma and riddle, it is now much easier to analyse the Indian counterpart of the basic motivations behind this relationship. In order to be able to view the problem in its wider perspective, it may be worthwhile to deal briefly with the basic objectives and goals of India's foreign policy before one deals with India's Russian policy as such.

Repeated use of phrases like neutral, neutralist, non-aligned and uncommitted has resulted in a semantic confusion which had hidden some of the more positive goals of India's foreign policy. In fact, some friends of India like William Clarke have wondered if India had a foreign policy at all or was just conducting a vigorous commentary on foreign affairs.⁵ There is no doubt that India has often appeared before the world in an expansive mood and her range of interests in foreign affairs seemed too large for so new a country. It may however be possible to explain this in terms of the basic motivation in India's foreign policy. To put it tersely, the advancement of India's national interests, which is the goal of India's, as of all other, foreign policies, could best be accomplished by an advancement of India's status in the world. Thus the initial years of India's foreign policy were essentially devoted to the understandable quest for a short cut to status. Until the outbreak of the Korean war, the two super powers still treated India as basically a Commonwealth concern; and it was only through the development of

independent relationships with the United States and the U.S.S.R. that India could assert her independence and make herself felt in the world.

The Korean War underlined the need for a bridge between the Great Powers; in a world where there were conflicting tendencies to get involved and wriggle out of minor wars, it was important to keep channels of communication open. Even as a "post office," however, India was now noticed; most countries of the world now recognised that India counted and there was a perceptible increase in India's status. In this phase of India's foreign relations two factors drew India closer to the Soviet Union: the apparent Soviet readiness after 1954 to project India as a factor in world politics and the apparent unreadiness of the United States to do so.

This phase, however, lasted only for a short time; it is a tribute primarily to the agility, astuteness and historical sense of the Indian Prime Minister that the elevation of India's foreign policy to a new, perhaps higher, level of stability was accomplished with ease. The Indian role as a bridge had dried out by the time the Indochinese war stopped. The Great Powers developed their own channels of communication (e.g. the Geneva Conference of the heads of state) and there were new aspirants for the role of the mediator, like the United Kingdom. From the status of a nation trying to be a bridge between the Great Powers, India then changed her role and attempted to emerge as their *area* of agreement. It is the spectacular success achieved by India in her new role that created some of the formidable problems for her foreign policy that she now faces.

INDIA'S NEW ROLE

It is necessary to elaborate the logic behind this Indian attempt to be a symbol of the new possibilities of a degree of United States-U.S.S.R. rapprochement. Apart from the generally recognised Communist-non-Communist division of the world, there is another and more formidable dividing line at work, between the developed and underdeveloped nations. What makes this line more

⁵ William D. Clarke, "The American Revolution," *International Affairs*, July, 1958.

pernicious and potentially explosive in the long run is that two other lines broadly coincide with this dividing line; it so happens that the developed world is in the main white and underpopulated and the underdeveloped world is coloured and overpopulated. If this line is taken into account, it cuts across the line dividing the Communist and the non-Communist world.

From the viewpoint of these divisions, the Indian and the Chinese ways of solving their problems have entirely different meanings and connotations. It is inherent in the nature of the Chinese pattern of development that its development should lead to a sharpening of conflicts among nations. It is the dynamic of the Indian approach to development, based on the utilisation of the surplus of the developed nations of the world, that it will stress international cooperation and goodwill among nations. To the extent that the Chinese approach is ultimately bound to assert the need for challenging the structure of world politics, the great powers are likely to have a common stake in the promotion of the Indian experiment. It has been the Indian goal, in short, to become the developed nations' model farm in the underdeveloped world.

A basic assumption behind this logic is the possibility and indeed the likelihood of United States-U.S.S.R. rapprochement. Nehru said in 1960:

I have always maintained that there is so much in common between these two great powers that all this business of the cold war is altogether artificial and unrealistic. Once they begin talking, as they have, despite occasional breakdowns and frustrations, the ground will be cleared of all the wreckage of ten years of suspicion and fear and what might be called areas of agreement might become visible.⁶

And one of the visible areas of agreement was India:

... today there is an almost universal understanding and appreciation of what we are trying

to do on the economic plane . . . that is, planning under a democratic pattern of socialism. This has set a new pattern for Asian and African development and it is significant that economists and other experts from both the worlds . . . are extremely interested in our development plans and our progress. . . . This makes India itself a kind of an area of agreement between opposing ideological forces.⁷

It is within this broad framework that Soviet-Indian relations have grown. However, the initial pattern of this relationship was based on less permanent foundations. In fact, the early basis of Indo-Soviet relations was India's unilateral anxiety to befriend the U.S.S.R. Symbolic of the Indian desire to cultivate good relations with Russia was the insistence by Nehru in early 1947, at the risk of creating a minor governmental crisis, that an ambassador be appointed to the U.S.S.R. and that the appointee be his sister.⁸

Symbolic of the Soviet attitude to India in these years was the inability of the ambassador to have even one interview with the Soviet dictator during her term of office. It was only after the Communist leader had discovered that his strategy in Korea had misfired that he took note of India and indeed accepted a Nehru proposal that a peaceable approach be brought to bear in dealing with Korea. To Stalin, however, India's foreign policy was a freak, if not a manifestation of the so-called "contradictions in the capitalist camp," and he never foresaw the possibility of a neutralist position in the global conflict of the post-war era.

Stalin's heirs realised the importance of India soon after his death; it also so happened that Indo-American relations reached their lowest point at this time. The consequence of several policy moves from Washington was interpreted in India as an attempt to curb her; without challenging the good faith of the United States it was pointed out by India that moves such as the extension of United States aid to Pakistan could result only in a serious arms race in the sub-continent and the creation of an acute security problem for her. A series of mistaken gestures from both sides and the use of invectives in public pronouncements further underlined to the

⁶ R. K. Karanjia, *The Mind of Mr. Nehru*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1960, p. 88.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 100-101.

⁸ Michael Brecher, *Nehru—A Political Biography*, London, Oxford, 1959, p. 349.

world that India and the United States were less than close friends.

Moscow took immediate note of the situation: by April, 1954, Malenkov, in an election speech, spoke of India in highest terms and the slogans of the following May Day, for the first time, included a reference to the Soviet people's desire for friendship with India. Earlier, an important trade agreement was signed between India and Russia envisaging the possibility of great expansion in their economic relations.

NEED FOR SOVIET AID

From the Indian point of view, however, preconditions of friendly relations were more than a mere acceptance of the use of her foreign policy for the cause of "peace." India hoped that the Soviet Union would accept the fact that a great deal of progress was occurring within India, that the Indian state did not deserve to be overthrown by a revolution. India hoped also that, as a country with a huge industrial base, the Soviet Union would be ready to assist India in her primary need—industrialisation. On January 26, 1955, *Pravda* editorially endorsed India's internal policies; the editorial was promptly used by the ruling party in an election in India, where the Communists were threatening to take over a state. By February, the Soviet Union agreed to extend credit and technical assistance to India for a steel plant. The whole of 1955 was a year of great Indo-Soviet amity; it is interesting to note that it followed 1954, the year of great Indian-Chinese amity.

There is little evidence as yet to show that the Soviet peace offensive in India and India's readiness to respond to it were in any way related to the Chinese peace offensive earlier. It may, however, be noted that the image that Chou En-lai projected of China at the Bandung conference might not have con-

formed with the image that India, and, perhaps, the U.S.S.R., had of China. With his peace offer to the United States, his excellent personal relations with the Prime Ministers who were loudest in attacking Soviet colonialism in Europe and his attempts at mediation between the aligned and the non-aligned nations at Bandung, the Prime Minister of China made a determined bid to make a debut in Asia and Africa as a totally independent political force, which needed neither India as its usher nor the Soviet Union as its mentor.

TEST OF FRIENDSHIP

During his visit to Russia in June, 1955, Nehru laid down the most important single test of Russia's friendship to India:

Let our coming together be because we like each other and we wish to cooperate and not because we dislike others or wish to do them injury.⁹

In his speeches during and after the visit to India in late 1955, the Soviet leader laid down the extent to which he was ready to go in evolving a more stable basis of Indo-Soviet relations:

1.) "Both we and our Indian friends would like to develop and strengthen our friendly relations in a way which would not change the friendly relations of India or of the Soviet Union with other States";¹⁰ 2.) "Certain more reasonable bourgeois leaders are now saying that it is necessary to increase aid from capitalist countries to underdeveloped countries. This is not a bad thing. Let the capitalist countries give such aid";¹¹ 3.) "Five countries are considered great powers. But if one analyses this objectively one involuntarily wonders why India is not considered a great power. . . . We consider India a Great Power and believe that she should occupy a prominent place among the great states of the world";¹² 4.) Disintegrating tendencies were harmful to India and India's integrity and unity were important. "We think that the interests of both India as a whole and the peoples of India suffer from this." Kashmir was an integral part of India and the Soviet Union would consider it to be so;¹³ 5.) The Russian experi-

⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru's *Speeches, 1953-57*, New Delhi, 1959, pp. 304-5.

¹⁰ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, VII, 52, 8 Feb. 1956.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, VII, 50, Jan. 25, 1956.

¹³ *Ibid.*

ence was not necessarily suited to India: "It is impossible to force the buffalo to eat meat; it is impossible for the tiger to eat grass";¹⁴ 6.) India's industrialisation would be aided by the Soviet Union; and 7.) The Soviets would change their view of Gandhi and the national struggle.

These points taken together have provided the bases for India's friendly relations with Russia in the following years: the promise of aid; the endorsement of India's unity; the acceptance of Indian national leadership as a progressive and desirable phenomenon; the promotion of India's status in the world; the acceptance of the desirability of India's friendship with the United States and of American aid to India; and finally, the use of Soviet influence to prevent the irresponsible functioning of its followers in India. The Soviet Union has in later years abided by these requirements: shortly after the twentieth party congress of the C.P.S.U., the Soviet economist Modeste Rubinstein went to the extent of envisaging the possibility of India's achieving socialism through the existing framework.¹⁵

Ideologically the Soviet position regarding India has not been unequivocal since this time; and in fact once a Soviet writer indulged in polemics with Nehru on his basic approach.¹⁶ However, the Soviet advice to the Indian Communist party has been on the side of moderation, and the Soviet newspapers welcomed the results of the election in India in 1957 and 1962, when the ruling party was returned to power. On Kashmir, the Soviet Union has more than once used its veto in the Security Council to prevent the passing of resolutions that India considered harmful for her national interests. No serious attempt has been made to prevent

the growth of Indo-United States relations.

And, finally, a very substantial amount of economic aid has been rendered. Apart from financing and helping the construction of India's pride steel project at Bhilai, the U.S.S.R. has given farm machinery, agreed to set up a heavy machine building plant, a drugs manufacturing unit, an optical glass manufacturing factory, a plant to manufacture coal mining machines; it has rendered technical and financial aid in oil exploration and production. The total volume of credit extended to India in the course of the last two plans, when Soviet aid began to flow in, has been of the order of Rs. 3.8 billion. While compared with the aid from the Western countries, particularly the United States, the Soviet aid may not be large, it has been a substantial addition to what India received from other friendly countries and indeed has increased India's leverage in dealing with terms of loans from other countries. Soviet aid has also helped India to build heavy industries.

Two aspects of Soviet aid make it of great symbolic significance for India: it has been large compared to the aid rendered by the U.S.S.R. to China (some say it is, in fact, larger¹⁷); and it has continued to flow in large quantities after India became the target of a Chinese military-political and ideological offensive. In fact, as Chinese-Indian relations deteriorated sharply, Soviet-Indian relations showed an upward trend. During this period, the Soviet Union declared its virtual neutrality on the India-Chinese border conflict (a statement Nehru called "unusual" and "fair"); but a studied attempt was made by both sides to demonstrate the continued friendship between India and the Soviet Union. In these years a number of Soviet leaders visited India—Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kozlov, Voroshilov, Suslov, Kosygin, Furtseva, Gromyko, Mikoyan, and Mukhitdinov; among the Indian leaders who visited the U.S.S.R. since 1959 are Prime Minister Nehru, President Rajendra Prasad, Finance Minister Morarji R. Desai and Railways Minister Jagjivan Ram. Many of these leaders declared Indo-Russian friendship to be

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, VII, 48, Jan. 11, 1956.

¹⁵ Modeste Rubinstein, "A Non-capitalist Path for Underdeveloped Countries," *New Times*, 28, July 5, 1956.

¹⁶ P. Yudin, "A Reply to the Basic Approach by Shri Jawaharlal Nehru," *World Marxist Review*, December, 1958.

¹⁷ e.g. Alvin Rubinstein in "Russia and the Uncommitted Nations," *Current History*, October, 1962.

inviolable; in their joint communiqué of February 16, 1960, Nehru and Khrushchev said: "As between India and the Soviet Union, at no time have their mutual relations rested on a firmer basis of friendship and understanding than now." Referring to this Khrushchev visit one Western expert on Sino-Soviet affairs, G. F. Hudson, noted:

The insult (to China) was symbolised by the fact that Khrushchev was in India on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty. . . . The impression created by the Khrushchev tour was probably the last straw in causing Mao to lose patience with Khrushchev and embark on a systematic campaign against him.¹⁸

What may also be noted is that in these years the Indian government managed to acquire from the Soviet Union helicopters for use in the border regions as well as road building equipment to make some of these areas approachable for the Indian Army. Finally, on May 5, 1962, the announcement was made that India would acquire from the Soviet Union a number of MIG-21 fighters and receive Soviet help in building a MIG factory.

The outbreak of military hostilities in October, 1962, put the U.S.S.R. in an unenviable position. Caught in a difficult situation in Cuba, the Soviet Union at first took a stand that was widely regarded in India as a departure from its earlier policy. On October 25, *Pravda* editorialised on the issue with a pro-China slant and even signalled the Indian Communists not to identify themselves with the Indian government's position. The end of the Cuban adventure and the huge Chinese offensive against Russian revisionism presumably made the U.S.S.R. return to its neutralist position by November 5, 1962. Later, in the Italian Communist Party Congress in early December, Frol Kozlov was reported to have criticised China's India policy as "adventurist." And in his speech to the Supreme Soviet shortly after this, Khrushchev himself reiterated the original Soviet position as stated by *Tass* on September 9, 1959. The speech, read in its entirety,

is a denunciation of much of the Chinese position. What is more, the doubts regarding the delivery of Soviet jets were set at rest by the Indian Prime Minister. Nehru announced repeatedly that he had been assured that the MIGs would come in and that some delay had occurred because of the Cuban and not the Chinese situation.

Few in India would regard the Soviet Union's friendship as an adequate defence against China. But there is also little doubt that it would be foolish of India not to see that it is one of the lines of defence it can muster against a formidable foe. With the open manifestation in recent years of the feebleness of ideology as a force counteracting power calculations, dictates of geography are bound to assert themselves in some ways; sheer geo-political considerations demand from both India and Russia at least an honest effort to befriend one another. Of the Soviet behaviour there can always be more than one explanation; any one of them would be regarded as controversial. It may, however, be an outdated view to regard Soviet friendliness to India as a result of her anti-Western inclinations alone. For India, on its part, has always made it clear to the Soviet Union that her relations with either of the great powers will be helped by signs of their rapprochement and not of their conflict. Unlike the inverse relationship that exists between Russo-American and Russo-Chinese relations, Indo-Russian relations can continue to improve only as part of a broad historical process: the replacement of the present conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union by a phase of cooperative coexistence. Viewed this way, the state of India's relations with Russia may well be a barometer of how the winds are blowing in the world.

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¹⁸ "Sino-Soviet Dispute," *China Quarterly*, 1961, Introduction.

India's political life, "beneath the surface of apparent . . . stability," is undergoing a transformation. One of the most important new changes is the "trend toward political activization of the masses." This trend ". . . is giving rise to a great deal of conflict and controversy. . . ; but, for better or for worse these are stages through which the democratic process in a status-ridden society like India's must pass."

Growing Pains of Indian Democracy

BY NORMAN D. PALMER

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SINCE October 20, 1962, when the Chinese launched a major offensive in the North East Frontier Agency and in Ladakh, the political scene in India has changed almost beyond recognition—indeed, almost beyond belief. Mentally as well as militarily, the people of India and their leaders were ill-prepared to meet the challenges posed by the Chinese attack. Their immediate reactions assumed two main forms. One was a mixture of incredulity and shock. The other was a great upsurge of national unity and determination, "an almost new birth of Indian spirit," to use Prime Minister Nehru's words.

The long-range effects of this traumatic experience will undoubtedly be profound, but at the moment one can only speculate on their precise nature. Much will depend on the subsequent behavior and actions of the Chinese, who have forfeited India's friendship for motives which are still a great puzzle, as far as Indians and almost everyone else are concerned.¹ The first shock effects will wear off, and during the protracted conflict that lies ahead it will be difficult for Indians to maintain the high degree of unity and

spirit which the Chinese attack engendered. Already there are signs that indecisiveness, divisions, and apathy are reappearing. But many Indians insist that India will never be the same again, either in its internal policies and attitudes or in its international outlook. It remains to be seen whether the "new India" will in fact be basically different from the old, and whether the changes in outlook and policies will be welcome or unwelcome.

The first and most notable political casualty of the Chinese attack was V. K. Krishna Menon, who as defense minister was blamed for the sad state of preparedness which the Chinese advances revealed. Until the Chinese wrote what is probably his political obituary, Krishna Menon appeared to be building a position of real political strength in India, based on Nehru's support, his key position in the Cabinet, his success in cultivating the junior officers and enlisted men of the Indian armed forces, his effective techniques of getting men favorable to him in key roles in the military establishment and elsewhere in the government, including the civil and diplomatic services, and his undeniable appeal to the masses of the people.²

Many Indians seemed to regard Menon as a man who had suffered much for India, who had been unfairly attacked and abused for India's sake, and who was entitled to ad-

¹ See Norman D. Palmer, "Trans-Himalayan Confrontation," *Orbis*, VI (Winter, 1963).

² See Emil Lengyel, *Krishna Menon* (New York: Walker and Company, 1962), especially Chaps. X–XVIII.

ditional laurels for his espousal of India's case abroad, especially on Kashmir, and for his role in the annexation of Goa. In February, 1962, he won a smashing victory in his contest for re-election to the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian Parliament) from North Bombay, in the most highly publicized contest of the third general elections. And then, at a high point of what seemed to be a promising political career, the Chinese struck. Within a few days, bowing to the insistence of the top leaders of his own party, Nehru dismissed the man who has sometimes been described, perhaps wrongly, as his closest friend.

The effects of the new crisis on Nehru himself have been something awesome to behold. It is obviously a great personal tragedy for the man who has been the unquestioned political leader of his country for a generation, who is now, at the age of 73, in the twilight of his career. The Chinese betrayed Nehru's faith in them, and forced him to undertake emergency measures which go against his own grain and which jeopardize the goals for which he has been fighting all his life. In this emergency he has seemed to lag behind public opinion in India, although he has at the same time articulated it. At times he has seemed tired, dispirited, indecisive; at other times he has been alert, inspiring, decisive. In these changes of mood and spirit he has again personified the feelings of the majority of his countrymen.

Nehru has confessed that he has been living under many illusions, and has made many mistakes; yet he has also voiced the new national spirit at this "crossroads of our history." For the first time in his career, his own political position, in a country whose political life he has dominated for as long as most men can remember, appeared to be vulnerable. Incredible as it may seem, many Indians, including many in his own party, believe that he might have been forced out of office if he had not risen to the emergency by discarding some of his most cherished beliefs and policies, by dismissing Krishna Menon, by requesting military assistance from the United States, the United Kingdom, and

other Western powers, and by taking a firm stand in opposition to Chinese pressures. This is indeed a new development in Indian politics. Yet, in a paradoxical way, Nehru's sudden vulnerability may have strengthened his position, and his confessions of past mistakes may have added to rather than detracted from his popularity and his greatness. He is still the greatest unifying force in India.

A few days after the attack which he did not think would ever materialize, Nehru made a remarkable confession in the Indian Parliament:

I want you all to realize the shock we suffered during the last week or so. We were getting out of touch with the realities of the modern world. We were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation, and we have been shocked out of it. . . . The real thing that's out of joint is our whole mentality, our whole Government, the way government is run here. . . . We have to get out of that rut and move swiftly to whatever we have to do.

Probably no great leader of a modern state has been able to make such a confession and maintain his political power. Yet Nehru has been able to capitalize on his confession. Indians will not soon forget his admission that "we were getting out of touch with the realities of the modern world" and "were living in an artificial atmosphere of our own creation"; but they have been less frank than Nehru himself in suggesting that the responsibility for the present difficulties extends to the apex of their political leadership. In fact, many of them are inclined to give Nehru credit for his confession.

THE MILITARY

Another extraordinary change in Indian political life relates to the new role of the military. The tradition of the subordination of the military to the civil authority was a legacy of the British which has been continued, at least until recently, in India. A standard complaint was that the political direction of the military was too weak; but the military leaders never attempted to take advantage of any ineptness in political control. When Krishna Menon was defense minister, some of his critics (who were about as num-

erous in India as in the United States) charged that he was taking advantage of his position to place his own favorites in high command positions and to politicize the armed forces, for the first time in modern Indian history. This danger, if it ever existed, has been removed.

The Indian army is now smarting under the humiliation of its ineffective showing against the Chinese intrusions in NEFA and Ladakh; but these reverses were due to poor deployment, equipment, and supply rather than to any slump in morale or in fighting capacities. Once the army is reorganized and properly equipped and supplied, it will undoubtedly be able to give a good account of itself. Indian troops have shown great courage and determination in fighting under adverse conditions and with inferior weapons in high altitudes against a numerically superior and better armed foe. They are preparing to defend Indian soil at whatever cost, and they expect to get better logistical and political support, and greater popular appreciation, than heretofore enjoyed.

Reporting from Leh, the capital of Ladakh, in mid-December, an American correspondent observed: "There is clear evidence of a decisiveness which, if it exists among the civil servants in New Delhi, is well camouflaged."³ Some of India's leading soldiers, including General Thimayya, who resigned as Army Chief of Staff because of differences with Krishna Menon, are now associated with the new National Defense Council. They are therefore in a position to exert real influence on defense policies. They, and many younger officers as well, may not sit idly by if they fail to get the necessary support from the politicians, or if they see nothing but indecisiveness in New Delhi. This is not to suggest that India is in any real danger of a military coup, but it does indicate a new and larger role for the military on the national scene. Even Nehru is not immune to pressures from this source.

³ James S. Keat, dispatch from Leh, Ladakh, dated Dec. 14, 1962, in the *Baltimore Sun*, Dec. 18, 1962.

⁴ This remarkable report was published in *The New York Times* of Oct. 29, 1962, under the headline: "Warfare Producing Big Change in India."

In a dispatch to *The New York Times* from New Delhi, dated October 28, 1962, A. M. Rosenthal declared: "The Chinese Communist invasion of India's northern frontiers has brought about profound changes in this country—in politics, in thought, in international attitudes and in the lives of the men in power."⁴ It not only "wrecked the political future" of Krishna Menon but substantially increased "the chances that the next Government of India will be led by moderates and conservatives of the Congress party rather than the left wing represented by Mr. Menon." This is in itself a political shift of the greatest significance.

The Chinese actions also forced a re-examination of India's basic foreign policy—nonalignment. It led Nehru to request military aid from the Western powers and to take other steps which he had previously criticized as inconsistent with nonalignment. "Although nonalignment will remain India's official policy . . . there will no longer be the same confidence in its practical virtues." It will in fact be a different kind of nonalignment, made so by the Chinese attack, the ambivalence of the Soviet Union and the nonaligned states, the prompt assistance extended by the aligned states of the West, and India's reassessment of the bases of its policy in the light of these developments.

As a result of the new upsurge of national unity, India is perhaps more truly a nation than it has ever been before. The fissiparous tendencies which have led some observers to fear that the country was in danger of political fragmentation have been transcended, at least for the time being. But the old fissures—caused by regional, linguistic, religious, caste and other divisions—are still there. If the national spirit flags, they may again reassert themselves. At the moment, however, the forces of national unity are dominant.

The enlarged conflict with China will continue to necessitate a major diversion of energies, resources, and planning from the more normal tasks of government and development. It will seriously jeopardize the prospects for the Third Five Year Plan, which was already in serious trouble. By the sum-

mer of 1962 it was apparent that because of shortages in transport, power, steel, coal, and especially foreign exchange, many of the targets of the Third Plan could not be realized. India's internal resources will be drawn upon increasingly to meet the needs of national defense, as well as of development and normal consumption requirements. This new drain on limited resources may be at least partially offset by stricter import controls, greater sacrifices and greater effort on the part of the people, the conversion of private holdings, and greater national unity. Henceforth, as Nehru has said, national planning must be considered to be an integral part of the over-all defense effort.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE NEEDS

The foreign exchange problem is almost intractable. India needs well over one billion dollars a year in foreign exchange, in addition to its disappointing export earnings, to meet the foreign exchange costs of the Third Plan and the mounting debt service charges on loans already incurred. It receives almost as much as it needs for these purposes from the United States and other countries, including the Soviet Union, and from international lending agencies, especially from the International Consortium of Nations (the "Aid to India Club"). But the amounts available from these sources are uncertain, whereas India's minimum foreign exchange needs are not. Now to these foreign exchange requirements must be added a substantial amount for the purchase and maintenance of expensive modern weapons and military equipment which India must get in order to develop an adequate defense posture.

The magnitude of the estimated defense needs may be gauged by a report that India has already asked for military assistance from the United States in the coming year to the value of approximately one billion dollars. This is one-third larger than India's total defense budget before the Chinese attack, and is approximately equivalent to the total foreign exchange requirements for the next year of the Third Plan. For the United States it would represent well over half of

the total amount appropriated in recent years for military assistance to all recipient countries. Such a grant or long-term, low interest loan would certainly encounter serious opposition in Congress if it were presented on other than a strictly emergency basis. If made available, this assistance would inevitably involve certain financial and other commitments on India's part.

India seems to have no choice but to attempt to mount a major defense effort on top of a greater development program. Even with an unprecedented mobilization of human and financial resources at home and unprecedented financial and other assistance from friendly countries, the success of its expanded efforts is by no means assured. If one of China's main motives in attacking India was to weaken and humiliate its largest Asian neighbor, to divert and distract India's leaders and peoples from the basic tasks of national development, it has at least partly succeeded. But the Chinese probably did not count on the effects of their actions on Indian morale and unity, or on the prompt moral and physical support which nonaligned India would receive from the Western countries. India may in fact emerge from its present ordeal a stronger, not a weaker nation. It can do so only if the level of internal effort and external assistance is lifted to new and unprecedented heights.

All political trends in India will undoubtedly be affected by the changes resulting from the new confrontation with China. As has been noted, because of this confrontation the forces of unity have gained new strength. The forces of disunity, while still present and persistent, seem to be at least temporarily pushed into the background. The imperatives of national defense will give further momentum to the already strong tendencies toward centralization. On the other hand, these tendencies are being at least partially counteracted by the growing role of some of the stronger chief ministers in the Indian states, by the introduction of a more coordinated and effective system of "democratic decentralization" known as *panchayati raj* (rule by *panchayats*), by the demands for

regional and linguistic autonomy, and by the Bhoodan, Gramdan, and *sarvodaya* movements, with which the names of two of India's best known leaders, Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan, are associated.

The dominance of the Congress party on the national scene has naturally given a lopsided character to the Indian party system. Many observers regard this as a threat to democracy in India, for they argue that a parliamentary democracy cannot function effectively in the absence of an effective opposition. On the other hand, India has probably benefited greatly in the formative years of its existence as an independent nation from the remarkable continuity of leadership and the high degree of political stability which the continued dominance of the Congress has afforded.⁵ Because of this dominance much of the political life of India has been carried on within the Congress, rather than outside of it.

In all probability, the Congress will remain in power at the national level and in most if not all of the state governments, even after Nehru goes. Certainly there is no discernible effective alternative in sight. But the picture of an all-powerful Congress has to be modified in many ways. In fact, all is not well with the Congress. As the third general elections revealed sharply, it is by no means as strong as its position at the national level would indicate. It is confronted with a great many serious threats: weak leadership, poor organization, internal divisions, and "groupism"; growing opposition to it on the part of many of the Indian people, especially the urban intellectuals; and increasingly effective opposition in many of the states. The crisis with China may help the Congress to retain its dominance at the national level and in the states. However, the Party will be under closer scrutiny than before and will be held strictly responsible for further "mistakes."

For those who think that India has a one-

party government, a detailed analysis of the political situation in each state will be a revealing exercise. In almost every state the Congress is faced with real opposition, which in many instances centers around one opposition group. The Swatantra party is now the major opposition in Bihar, Gujarat, Orissa (where an important local party, the Ganantra Parishad, has joined it), and Rajasthan, the Communist party in Andhra, Kerala, and West Bengal, the Jan Sangh in Madhya Pradesh, the newly formed United Socialist party in Uttar Pradesh, and the Praja Socialist party in Mysore (also strong in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh). The Akali Dal, a militant Sikh party, provides the main opposition in the Punjab. In Madras, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, which advocates a separate South Indian state of Dravidinad, made surprising gains in the third general elections. Weaker opposition is provided by the remnants of the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti in Maharashtra, and by the Hill Leaders Conference in Assam.

Almost all the members of the Assembly in Jammu and Kashmir belong to the National Conference or to affiliated parties, but this local version of a united front cooperates with the Congress, at least on national matters. About 60 per cent of all members of state assemblies are members of the Congress party. The absence of a united opposition gives the Congress an effective working majority in every state except Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan.

POLARIZATION

Just as there has been an apparent polarization within the Congress, with a more discernible split between a left and a right wing, so does a growing polarization of politics to the right and left of the Congress seem to be more apparent. The second general elections in 1957 witnessed the emergence of strong groups to the left of the Congress. The third elections in 1962 led to a greater polarization of the left-of-Congress strength in favor of the Communists, who maintained their representation and actually increased the percentage of the popular vote from less than

⁵ This point has been ably developed by Professor Richard L. Park, in "Problems of Political Development," in Philip W. Thayer, ed., *Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 103-4.

nine to over ten per cent. The P.S.P. (Praja Socialist party) which fared quite well in 1957, lost heavily in 1962 both in popular vote (from 10.41 to 6.88 per cent) and in the number of successful candidates for state assemblies or the Lok Sabha.

If the second elections produced a leftist challenge to the Congress, the third elections, besides polarizing that challenge, produced the phenomenon of an emergent right.⁶ The Jan Sangh, the only important Hindu communalist party, registered impressive gains in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, and more than doubled its representation in the Lok Sabha (from 6 to 14 members). The new Swatantra party, which criticized the whole approach to planning of the Congress party and the Government, made a surprising showing in Bihar and Rajasthan, fared well also in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, and Uttar Pradesh, and elected 18 members of the Lok Sabha. It suffered a "rout," as its veteran "super-chief," C. Rajagopalachari—"Rajaji"—confessed, in prestige fights in Madras and North Bombay.

The emergent right has not polarized around a single party, and can hardly be expected to do so because of the communal divide. Rajaji and other Swatantra leaders have tried to rescue conservatism from communalism. The Jan Sangh, which denies that it is a communal party, is supported almost wholly by Hindu communalists and Hindi-speaking people of north India. It has no following at all outside of the Hindi areas of north India, and appreciable support only in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. It has almost no prospect of appealing to non-Hindi-speaking Indians. The Swatantra party tries to appeal to voters in all parts of the country, of all classes and all castes. But it is still identified as a party of rich businessmen and "feudal" interests, and it has no significant following outside of five or six states. Hence the polarization on the right is not so impressive as the upsurge of Jan Sangh and Swatantra support would suggest at first glance.

⁶ See Myron Weiner, "India's Third General Elections," *Asian Survey*, II (May, 1962).

Until recently, at least, the Communist party of India has retained its substantial support in several Indian states, notably West Bengal, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh, in spite of personal rivalries among its leaders and deep divisions over questions of tactics and strategy. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program, the growing rift between the Soviet Union and China, and, above all, the worsening of relations between India and China since 1959, have created serious divisions in the C.P.I. The Chinese moves in 1959 caused at least a three-way split in the top command of the Party. One faction favored support of China, apparently on the ground that a "socialist" state could by definition do no wrong; another held that the C.P.I. should support the Indian position on the McMahon Line and on Tibet, for otherwise the Party would alienate the Indian people; while a third advocated an in-between position, with emphasis on peaceful negotiations between India and China.

The C.P.I. was also divided ideologically on a regional basis. The West Bengal Communists tended to take a pro-China line, whereas the Kerala Communists argued that Khrushchev's criticisms of Stalin were not relevant to India. Ajoy Ghosh, the general secretary of the C.P.I., took a relatively moderate position, generally favorable to Moscow. Ghosh tried to effect a compromise between the various factions of the Party. His death in January, 1962, was a blow to the hopes for Party unity.

After the general elections in the following month, from which the C.P.I. emerged with undiminished strength, the National Council, meeting in April, elected two successors to Ghosh, instead of one. S. A. Dange, a veteran Communist leader from Bombay, a right-of-center critic of China, who was defeated in his campaign for re-election to the Lok Sabha in the February elections, was given the new post of chairman. E. M. S. Namboodiripad, a left-of-center Communist leader who had headed the Communist government in Kerala from 1957 to 1959, was chosen general secretary. The Party leaders were, however, unable to agree on resolutions relating to the

general elections or to the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U. After long and apparently bitter debate within the Party, the National Council, meeting in August, endorsed a resolution favorable to Moscow.

The Chinese attack in late October, 1962, finally forced the C.P.I. to adopt a definitely anti-China stand, which was reflected in a resolution adopted by the National Council on November 1, 1962, against the protests of the pro-China faction. This called on all Indians to unite in resistance to the Chinese aggression. In view of the differences among the top leaders and in view of the current unpopularity of the Chinese Communists in India, it is a minor miracle that the C.P.I. has been able to hold together as well as it has, retain its solid core of support in at least three key Indian states, and remain the leading opposition group in the Indian Parliament. But the C.P.I. is in serious trouble, and it has never been more deeply divided.⁷

Beneath the surface of apparent political stability, under the aegis of the Congress party, a number of major changes have been under way, which in time may create a new political climate in India. It cannot now be determined whether these changes will be for the better or for the worse, and whether they will conflict with or be furthered by the changes resulting from the new confrontation with China. "On the whole, however," in the opinion of Rajni Kothari, one of India's most astute political scientists,

there is no doubt that the country is set on a fascinating period of transformation, one in which political development is both keeping pace with economic and social development and perhaps also providing a larger framework which is shaping and directing the latter towards considered and deliberated objectives.⁸

Two of the major undercurrents of political change flow from what Dr. Kothari has called

"the process of political activation" and from the changing patterns of political leadership. Kothari has well described "the 'movement of classes' in the political arena":

The phenomenon consists in well-articulated social groups from different strata of society becoming aware of their conflicting interests and contesting for the country's scarce resources. . . . It also consists in large sections of the people occupying positions lower down in the hierarchy, till now submerged in a close social order, denied access to power and ignorant of their rights under a democratic constitution, now becoming conscious, getting organised and asserting themselves vis-a-vis their superiors.

This "real as distinct from formal enfranchisement of the lower strata in society," as Kothari points out, "is a fact of great importance." It is broadening the base of political activity in India, with all its attendant benefits and evils. It tends to politicize existing factions and rivalries in rural India, as Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan, among others, have charged, and thereby to accentuate these divisions. Political parties and politicians are appealing more and more to caste, communal, and other interests.

To turn again to Kothari, "the important thing to notice here is that although use may be made of caste solidarities in the winning of votes, castes are shedding off their most characteristic features, are becoming interest-oriented and behaving more like pressure groups than status groups in a fixed hierarchy." Hence caste and communal groupings are being transformed "into some sort of *political classes* facing each other in a competition for power." For the time being this new trend toward political activation of the masses is giving rise to a great deal of conflict and controversy, often of an ideological nature; but, for better or for worse, these are stages through which the democratic process in a status-ridden society like India's must pass. In a sense, therefore, these are growing pains of democracy.

Because new groups are becoming politically more articulate and more influential, new types of leaders are emerging on the Indian political scene. These new leaders are usually not so "smooth," not so well educated,

⁷ An excellent brief analysis of recent divisions within the Communist party of India is given in Robert A. Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking and the Communist Parties of Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, XLI (January, 1963), 334-7.

⁸ All of the quotations from Dr. Kothari are taken from his article entitled "Developing Political Patterns," in *Seminar* (New Delhi), No. 34 (June, 1962). The italics are in the original article.

not so Westernized, not so much at home in international or even national politics, not so familiar with the English language (which many of them do not speak at all) as the group of Western-educated Indians who have thus far dominated the political life of their country. But the new leaders have deeper roots in Indian life and thought and in their own constituencies. They probably reflect more faithfully the wishes as well as the prejudices of the people whom they represent. They are mostly local politicians, and most of them will act like local politicians if they go to the state capitals or to New Delhi; but from among these local political leaders with local followings will come many of the future leaders of the Indian nation. These leaders are already to be found at nearly all levels of Indian politics, from the village *panchayats*, the *panchayat samitis*, and the *zila parishads* of the new *panchayati raj* system to the Lok Sabha.

New leaders are already appearing in the top command of the political parties. To some degree, it seems, the focus of power and influence in the parties is shifting from the central government to the states.⁹ There party leaders are in a better position to exert influence where it matters most in the age of political activization, for example, in the selection of candidates for office at all levels, including the Lok Sabha. Many of the leaders of the Congress party are now in the states, or were in the states until recently, like Y. B. Chavan, who was chief minister of Maharashtra before he succeeded Krishna Menon as defense minister, or C. Subramaniam, who was finance minister of Madras before he won a seat in the Lok Sabha in the third general elections and then became minister of steel and heavy industries in the central government.

The chief ministers in the states—all lead-

⁹ This is even true of the Communist party. "Like other Indian parties, . . . the C.P.I. has been undergoing a significant change: leadership at the all-India level is giving way to state-based leadership, and this transition represents a strong centrifugal pull upon the party." Robert A. Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking and the Communist Parties of Asia," *op. cit.*, p. 334.

ers of the Congress—are now a strong group. They will undoubtedly have an increasing voice in Congress affairs, including the choosing of a successor to Prime Minister Nehru. Eventually, if not immediately, it is probable that a chief minister may succeed to Nehru's office, although he will, of course, like any other successor to such a towering personality, lack Nehru's stature and popular appeal. Y. B. Chavan is already being spoken of as a possible prime minister of India. It is also important to note that some recent or present chief ministers, like the new chief minister of Kerala, R. Shankar (who is a member of the Ezheva community, the largest community in the State) belong to lower castes. Indeed, Sanjivayya, who was chief minister of Andhra Pradesh and who is now president of the Congress party, is an "untouchable," the first "outcaste" to occupy either post.

Thus even before the Chinese struck in the north, as Kothari perceived, India was "set on a fascinating period of transformation" which may provide a broader base for political as well as economic and social development. The enlarged conflict with China, as Ambassador B. K. Nehru told the National Press Club in Washington on November 21, 1962, "has been a traumatic experience which has caused a turmoil in Indian political thought." This turmoil, adding unknown new dimensions to the continuing changes in Indian political life, is bound to lead to significant changes in internal politics as well as in external policies. Indians must gear themselves more effectively for the greater needs of national defense, while at the same time they must intensify their efforts to develop the kind of political, economic, and social structure that will be worth defending. Neither objective can be sacrificed in the testing time that lies ahead.

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"Ultimately," comments this specialist, "the new tentativeness in India's attitude toward the Commonwealth is the product of the bewildering march of changes in its foreign policy and international attitudes."

India's Ties to the Commonwealth

By ROSS N. BERKES

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IT is possible to argue—convincingly—that India's interest in the Commonwealth is one of the more subtle, sophisticated aspects of its outlook in world affairs. As Taya Zinkin once wrote in the *Manchester Guardian*, way back in the days of 1954 (pre-Suez): "Mr. Nehru's policies show how much he values the extra inches the Commonwealth platform adds to his stature." Becoming a senior partner of the Commonwealth, Nehru's importance—always great—could be brought to bear with even greater weight not only on Great Britain, but through Britain on the United States. On other grounds, the Commonwealth was a measuring rod for India's new and cherished independence. That Nehru could disagree with Britain from within the Commonwealth, or that India could become a republic and still belong to the Commonwealth—such were part of the psychic income to be derived from the connection.

Perhaps there was one other imponderable; something stemming from one of the few elements in common among the members of the club, an element rather well described by Britain's John Strachey as "a capacity for parliamentarianism." This is that the Commonwealth has become a device enabling

India "to be of the Western camp, but not in it."¹ Surely few educated Indians have not suffered moments of doubt regarding the price of nonalignment in India's arbitrary disassociation from the greater, more vigilant democracies. The Commonwealth link with Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other members provided periodic reassurance that nonalignment was a dictate of foreign policy, nothing more fundamental. How else should one interpret the uniquely Indian way of combining a celebration of India's eleventh anniversary as a republic with what has been described as the greatest demonstration ever assembled along New Delhi's processional route? Some two and one-half million people enthusiastically welcomed Queen Elizabeth II, a monarch who, in the words of President Prasad, was to be greeted "not only as the Head of the oldest democracy in the world, but also as the Head of a great Commonwealth." Whose Commonwealth? Well, India's, for one.

Enough has been said by now to convey the view that India's attachment to the Commonwealth has more to do with the imponderables of psychology than with more practical issues of gain. With all due respect, Dean Acheson was wrong in that ill-timed, ill-fated West Point speech early last December—as Britain's Prime Minister promptly pointed out—in describing the Commonwealth rather disdainfully as an organization "which has

¹ See the excellent treatment presented by J. D. B. Miller in his book, *The Commonwealth in the World* (1958).

no political structure, unity or strength," and which "enjoys a fragile and precarious relationship by means of the sterling area and preferences in British markets." The first part may have been apt enough, however unacceptable to a British Prime Minister. It was the passage on the basis of the "fragile and precarious relationship," which more properly entitled Macmillan to the retort that Acheson "seems wholly to misunderstand the role of the Commonwealth in world affairs." The sterling area is not a function of the Commonwealth, and the issue of preferences in British markets is of greatest concern to those countries whose attachment to Britain and to the Commonwealth is considerably deeper than trade could ever make it.

As for India and Imperial Preference (now more generally called Commonwealth Preference), Indian exports to Britain are not so significantly helped as present diplomatic pyrotechnics on Britain's Common Market negotiations tend to imply. Tea, which is duty-free, makes up fully half of India's exports to Britain. Hides, skins, raw wool, raw cotton, and manganese—duty-free also—bring the accounting up to nearly two-thirds of India's exports to Britain. The status of none of these items in the British market is significantly a matter of tariff advantage. Through Commonwealth Preference one item has enjoyed an advantage: cotton manufactures, especially the semi-manufactured product known as "grey cloth." Rapidly-growing Asian centers of cotton manufacturing such as India, Pakistan and Hong Kong enjoy a duty-free entry into the British market, as against tariffs of 17.5 to 20 per cent on such imports from non-Commonwealth countries, and even an added stringent quota on grey cloth from China and Japan.

IMPERIAL PREFERENCE

By 1958, Britain's own cotton textile industry in Lancashire was in such difficulties that the added competition from the three Commonwealth Preference sources led to an acute crisis. As Sir David Eccles grimly told the House of Commons at the time, "... although it was the duty-free imports from In-

dia, Pakistan, and Hongkong which were eating into the domestic market, the Government could not impose tariffs or quotas on goods from these sources without striking at the root of the Imperial Preference System." Awkward as it was, this matter was controlled, if not solved, by winning voluntary agreements from the cotton industries of all three and fixing ceilings for imports of cotton cloth into Great Britain.

To return, somewhat belatedly, to the point, what is important to India about Imperial Preference is largely what it has done for India's export of grey cloth. The future of the Indian economy is a function of new and different manufactured goods, some of which must compete abroad for the added foreign exchange which will be increasingly needed. This places India's stake considerably beyond the narrow, archaic, inapplicable confines of Imperial Preference—a point to be observed later when we turn to India and the European Common Market.

That the Commonwealth has contributed in a material way in India's relationship with Great Britain is, then, not very convincingly demonstrated by citing Imperial Preference. Common defense policy, or even cooperative defense, is not a responsibility of the Commonwealth. About the only security feature deriving from membership in the Commonwealth is that British military support is more readily available, and, further, that other alliance commitments contracted by Britain are apparently uninvokable against Commonwealth states. The latter point was most graphically illustrated in the reverberations of India's military take-over of Goa from the Portuguese in December, 1961. Great Britain's oldest alliance, dating back to the fourteenth century, is with Portugal. There was almost universal condemnation in Britain—official as well as unofficial—of India's aggressive action in literally pushing Portugal out of its remaining colonial enclaves in India. Yet the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Home, felt obliged to make clear and explicit that "Her Majesty's Government informed the Portuguese Government, as indeed they did in 1954, that in spite of our obligations under

the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, it would be impossible for Her Majesty's Government to engage in hostilities against any member of the Commonwealth."

FREE ENTRY

One of the special premiums of Commonwealth membership, for long regarded as an essential feature of the association, was an historic right of free entry (e.g., immigration) to Great Britain of citizens of any other part of the Commonwealth. As in the case of Imperial Preference, the benefits were not generalized among the various units of the Commonwealth, but were bilaterally centered on Britain and its relations with all other Commonwealth states. The proportions of this British testimonial to Commonwealth togetherness was epitomized in the remarks of the British Home Secretary, early in 1962, to the effect that about one-fourth of the world's entire population was "legally entitled to come and stay in this already densely-populated country."

Free entry of Commonwealth citizens was little more than a proud, symbolic gesture until approximately 1960, the year that seems to have marked the beginning of serious population inundations from the West Indies, India, Pakistan and Cyprus. It took the Bishop of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich to come out boldly and frankly, with appropriate logic, remarking:

To say that because we are the mother of the Commonwealth, every overseas immigrant should be welcomed to an island already overpopulated with thousands of its own people, inadequately housed and with great problems of overcrowding and squalor in our own cities, is utterly absurd.

COMMONWEALTH IMMIGRANTS ACT

Thus one of the great symbols of the Commonwealth, free entry of Commonwealth citizens into Britain, fell with the passage of Britain's "Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962." Because it excepted, implicitly, those migrating from the non-Commonwealth Republic of Ireland, and because by further implication it affected mainly West Indians, East Indians, Pakistanis and—to a lesser ex-

tent—Africans, the Act was greeted rather universally as a severe blow to the concept of the Commonwealth, and particularly to that element hailed proudly under the banner of racial equality. Few Indians—West or East—could understand why Irishmen, who had renounced the Commonwealth as well as the monarchy, were permitted a continuing right of free entry to Great Britain, least of all after the privilege was withdrawn from Commonwealth citizens. British reassurances that racial discrimination was part of neither the sowing nor the harvesting of the Act, particularly in the light of increasing racial problems within England itself, have not been so convincing as many had hoped. Sir Norman Manley, at the time Prime Minister of Jamaica, deplored the Act even before it was passed, arguing in mid-November, 1961, that "The Commonwealth will never be the same again. England has failed the first time it has had to cope with the problem of assimilating a fairly substantial number of persons of different races and color."

The statistics of the problem indicated a declining immigration to Britain from Commonwealth countries from about 1955 through 1959. While most of the Commonwealth immigrants did come from the West Indies and the Indian subcontinent, the total Commonwealth immigration during that five-year period had averaged no more than 32,000 a year. In 1960, however, the figure doubled, and in 1961 it nearly doubled again. Indeed, it was reported with alarm in the House of Commons that in the first ten months of 1961, over 113,000 immigrants had arrived in Great Britain from the Commonwealth, half of whom had come from the West Indies and about 19,000 each from India and Pakistan. Figures for the first half of 1962, the remaining period prior to the coming into force of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1962, were even more dramatic, being in the neighborhood of 95,000 for the half-year. The added swelling, however, was surely to be accounted for in large part by those anticipating the law and hence anxious to beat the deadline.

India, one of the Commonwealth countries

with reciprocal free entry for citizens of the United Kingdom, made the expected notations about the possibilities of racial discrimination inherent in the legislation, rather caustically referred to the potential superiority of citizens of non-Commonwealth countries over Commonwealth citizens, but otherwise took the matter in stride. Some two months after the Act had come into force, Nehru was asked in the Indian Parliament about the effect of the Act on Indians going to the United Kingdom, and whether the Government of India was taking any steps to persuade the British government to liberalize its policy. Nehru's written response was a model of brevity and detachment. "The effect of the Act," he replied, "will be to reduce the rate of outflow of Indians desiring to emigrate to the United Kingdom. The Government does not contemplate taking any steps in this regard."

There are two other features of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act in its impact upon India that should be brought forward. First is to note that Indian sensitivity to Britain's decision was directed less to the adverse effect it would have on its own citizens, and more to the presumed abridgement of Commonwealth principles that it represented. Two principles were involved: racial equality, and prior consultation on matters of mutual concern. The former has already been referred to. Perhaps the essence of the latter issue is a question of how one defines "prior consultation." But in any case the Indian government, having been advised by the British of their legislative intentions through an *aide-mémoire* some six months before the Act was passed, responded promptly by deploring, among other things, "the absence of previous consultation before taking a decision to impose very drastic curbs which would affect the considerable traffic of persons between India and the United Kingdom." The British Labour party, sitting in Opposition, made even more of the point by attempting to attach an amendment "declining to approve a Bill" which "without adequate inquiry and without full discussion at a meeting of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, removes from Commonwealth citizens . . .," and so forth.

PRIOR CONSULTATION

It is at least questionable whether Commonwealth practice, or Commonwealth principles, would have dictated that a matter of such intimate concern to the domestic affairs of Great Britain belonged on the agenda of the annual meetings of the Commonwealth Premiers. When one recalls that the departure of South Africa from the Commonwealth was the consequence of a complete break between it and the other members as to internal racial policies, and that even this, at the time (March, 1961), was not discussable as an agenda item in the Tenth Conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, one might wonder at the discriminating logic requiring this act of British sovereignty to come under formal Commonwealth review. The requirement of consultation, valid or not, is one point; means and methods—or specifications as to the appropriate vehicle of consultation—are quite another. Surely nothing in Commonwealth history, practice, law, or principle would seem to have justified the British Labour party's implicit insistence on consultation by means of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' periodic conferences.

Of the three burrs, then, attached to the Commonwealth Immigrants Act and prickling Indian sensitivity, the one on prior consultation may have been the most disconcerting. Within certain somewhat undefinable limits, consultation in advance of policy decisions—particularly British policy decisions—gradually became for India one of the more attractive potentials of the Commonwealth system. The limits were narrow, because even India was most circumspect about using Commonwealth conferences for its incessant strictures against South Africa. The point at which Indian sensitivity in this regard reached its highest, and where Indian enthusiasm for the Commonwealth was close to its lowest, was with reference to Britain's Suez intervention in 1956. John Strachey has suggested this as the worst example of the breakdown in Commonwealth consultation, and goes on to add with acute wisdom that "the British Government acted, not only without inform-

ing important Commonwealth Governments (Canada and India), but, it is impossible to avoid concluding, without informing them precisely because it knew that they would not agree.”²

Strachey suggested that it was Nehru's firm refusal in the face of much hostile domestic opinion to leave the Commonwealth in 1956 that may well become identified as a turning point in Commonwealth development. The point was well taken; suggesting as it did that in this experience the Indian government realized that it was not faced simply with the choice of agreeing with Britain or leaving the Commonwealth. As he put it:

They saw that a third and preferable course remained open to them. They could remain in the association but at the same time express—as they certainly did—dissent from the British action in the most unequivocal terms.

Nonetheless, Nehru's moment of doubt regarding the Commonwealth connection would appear to have been occasioned as much, and probably more, by his despair over the failure of other Commonwealth members to support India's stand on Kashmir in the Security Council of the United Nations. In any case, the usual reference to India's public low-point in its Commonwealth commitment is the bitter statement made by Nehru in the Lok Sabha on March 25, 1957. The subject was Kashmir and—for India—the miserable way it had been handled in the Security Council. As Nehru phrased it at the time, despite the “painful shocks” which India had experienced recently, especially over Kashmir, it was desirable for her to remain in the Commonwealth “in the present context.” In an addendum, Nehru advised that India's membership in the Commonwealth was one of the matters open to review “from time to time in the light of changing conditions.”

It could be of value here to note that the next time any question of India's leaving the Commonwealth came before the Indian Parliament seems to have occurred five years later, almost to the day, in connection with

the British bill on Commonwealth immigration. On this occasion, Nehru informed the Lok Sabha that India would not leave the Commonwealth as a consequence of Britain's enactment of the bill (not that there was any serious expectation that it would), and further: “We may or may not leave the Commonwealth, but if we leave it, it will be for wider reasons.”

ZONE OF “WIDER REASONS”

One is tempted to linger in the quicksand of conjecture as to the possibilities to be identified under the heading of “wider reasons.” Certainly the Commonwealth crisis in 1961 over South Africa might have led to such an identification had not South Africa itself broken the tie. And yet India did not precipitate the crisis, lead any Commonwealth crusade, or present any threats or ultimata. The catalysts were Nyerere of Tanganyika, the leader of a territory not then a member of the Commonwealth, and Tengku Abdul Rahman of Malaya. Perhaps Nehru's zone of wider reasons would have been reached had a racist South Africa's continuation in the Commonwealth become Tanganyika's reason for turning its back on the association. Having spoken the previous year about the explosive nature of apartheid and racial discrimination and of the threat that these were to the very foundations of the Commonwealth, Nehru took the occasion of South Africa's withdrawal to express his “relief” and to assure a London audience that the Commonwealth had been strengthened by South Africa's departure.

If Kashmir had put Nehru within the zone of “wider reasons” in 1957, its unfruitful return to the Security Council five years later provoked Nehru into similar flights of out-

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² John Strachey, *The End of Empire* (1959), p. 253.

"To feed and maintain [the Indian] population is the real battle which India and her friends have to fight," warns this specialist. "Clearly, the short-term, immediately pressing problem is to keep the people from starving without importing food, and the long-term dilemma is to feed them adequately with a properly balanced diet."

India's Battle for Food

By HENRY MADDICK

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EVENTS ON HER border with Tibet and China have focused attention on India during the last half-year; the drama of this clash brought her into the headlines of the world press. Yet for long India has faced a struggle of a far more lasting character and one which, in its own way, contains far more heroic implications. The root of this is the explosion which has added and is adding to her population at a terrifying rate. The 1951 figure of 360 million had become 438 million by the 1961 census and the most reliable estimates available predict a net increase of 117 million in 10 years to bring the figure to 555 million. By 1976, India will have added the present population of the United States to her 1951 figure. To feed and maintain this population is the real battle which India and her friends have to fight.

The reasons for this are so well known as to require no more than the briefest summarization: the great improvements of medical science and the growth of multi-national aid in this field has disturbed the balance between population and immediately usable resources. Of the great killer diseases, malaria is almost under control; smallpox is being actively fought and the death rate has dropped, and as education spreads, so will its incidence be reduced to negligible proportions; education and the availability of clean water supplies

have already cut down the impact of cholera and typhus, and deaths from these causes are likely to fall drastically. Improved public health measures including inoculations at the millions strong assembly for the great mela at Hardwar last year prevented any outbreak of these diseases and hence their spread in home districts by returning pilgrims.

The consequent improved health of the people also contributes to increased fertility. While large declines in the death rate result from activity external to the individual and the family unit, a fall in the birth rate requires deliberate action by individual couples together with an understanding of the methods of family limitation. The former requires public action, the latter individual motivation, and while family planning today occupies a significant place in government programmes, it will take a considerable time before this radically reduces the birth rate. Meanwhile, the people must be fed and if India is to conserve her foreign exchange, they must be fed from internal resources.

This in itself is a gigantic task; in addition, present nutritional standards are inadequate. In part, insufficient food is available; probably one-third of the people are uncertain of getting one "square meal" a day. For two-thirds of the remainder, there is bulk of a low nutritional value, the gravest deficiencies being in proteins and protective foods. Calcula-

tions made by various governmental committees showed shortfalls of two-thirds in the intake per capita of fruit and vegetables, more than one-half in milk and milk products, 85 per cent in other fats, one-third in sugar, three-quarters in meat and fish products, and over 95 per cent in egg production. The only balance is in the production of cereals, and the total required of cereals grows with every additional mouth which survives the weaning period. During the current five year plan—now entering its second year—the production of food grains has to increase by 32 per cent from 76 to 100 million tons. Clearly, the short-term, immediately pressing problem is to keep the people from starving without importing food, and the long-term dilemma is to feed them adequately with a properly balanced diet. What is entailed in attempting this target? Can it, in fact, be achieved?

I.

The amount of land available, the rainfall and the temperature must be the base from which any estimates start. India, with a total land area of 806 million acres, has some 355 million acres under cultivation; another 80 million acres are permanent pasture or cultivable wastes. Available cultivable land is put as 0.82 acres per head—roughly one-third of the figure for the United States. Accurate estimates as to what increase in these figures can be achieved by reclamation, at an economic cost, must wait upon an official investigation now in progress. The present plan projects a modest increase of one per cent from this source.

The real increase in production must come from other sources—irrigation, use of fertilizers, control of pests, better seeds, improved agricultural methods and better implements, and a drastic reform in land holding. Undoubtedly, the most important of these is irrigation.

India does not hold her rivers sacred foolishly—water provides the means of, and the theme for, life everywhere—from its absence in the deserts of Rajasthan to its overabundance in Kerala and the Eastern Punjab. The whole rhythm of agriculture

is linked to the monsoon rain and its failure can mean hunger and even starvation for millions. Estimates of the average rainfall suggest that this is more than adequate and moreover that only some 17 per cent of the surface water and some 20 per cent of the underground water available annually is at present being used. An increase in the amount of water made available would have two results—it would reduce the dependence on the monsoon, and more important, it would make possible continuous cultivation. At present only one-fifth of the cultivated land carries more than one crop a year. Surface irrigation schemes, wells, and tube wells must figure large in the agricultural program and the government aims to provide water for 175 million acres over the next 20 to 25 years, using about 60 per cent of the available water for nearly 50 per cent of the cultivated land. If flood control can be combined with water conservation and usage, a considerable contribution can be made to agricultural production.

The greater part of the cultivated areas have growing temperatures for the whole or practically the whole of the year, particularly in the rich Ganges-Brahmaputra basin. With water all year, agricultural production could change from seasonal to perennial cropping, with all that that implies for rotation of crops, and crop diversification, thus enriching the diet and reducing dependence on the vast acreage of grain.

Of almost equal importance would be the widespread use of manures and fertilizers. At the present time, fertilizers are used on only a small part of the land and at much less than the optimum rate of application. Present production targets are only about 2.5 per cent of the likely requirement if farmers can be moved to demand it. Animal manure is used more for heating and cooking than for restoring the fertility of the land; the campaigns for growing and applying more green manures and for processing and using urban and rural compost are only now getting under way. Other factors that will greatly increase the crop yield are the use of pesticides with the vigour and volume of their

Agricultural Production: 1950–1951 to 1960–1961

Commodity	Million tons	1950– 51	1955– 56	1956– 57	1957– 58	1958– 59(a)	1959– 60(b)	1960– 61(c)
Rice		20.9	27.1	28.6	24.9	30.4	29.3	32.0
Wheat		6.6	8.6	9.3	7.7	9.8	9.7	10.0
All cereals		43.7	54.9	57.4	53.0	62.6	60.5	64.0
Pulses		8.5	10.9	11.4	9.5	12.9	11.2	12.0
Foodgrains (cereals and pulses)		52.2	65.8	68.8	62.5	75.5	71.7	76.0

Notes:

(a) Partially revised estimates. (b) Final estimates. (c) Provisional.

Source: Third Five Year Plan, p. 302, Table 1.

application in Japan where the country evening is pungent and heavy with derris powder.

The future of animal husbandry lies in the production of high grade animals to provide food products according to the dietetic prejudices of the people. For many people meat-eating is abhorrent, and everywhere this ban applies to beef. However, much nutrient value can be obtained from milk and milk products and the target is to achieve a higher yield of these, and an increase in other acceptable meat producing animals. This can be attained only through selective breeding to upgrade stock and by providing adequate grazing which, since good grazing land can come only from the cultivable potential, itself can only be a by-product of a more intensified and diversified agriculture. As one Food and Agriculture Organization document put it "At present (1959) most animals have to scrounge for what they can get and for most of the year they are practically starved." To the authors of this report, adequate "surplus over maintenance" rations which would produce draft power, milk or fattening were lacking. The future appears to lie in the selective breeding of food animals, and the strengthening of draft animals until such time as it becomes economically possible for the peasant cultivators, either individually or in co-operation, to replace them with light machinery, of the type used in Japan. The same formula of selective breeding and adequate feeding applies to poultry. Only in this way

can egg production be raised to the desired target of one egg per person per day.

If all these proposals, cursorily sketched in here, were put into effect, what might be the result? A word of caution is necessary—making estimates for a sub-continent over periods of 20 to 50 years can at best be only approximations. Accepting the liability to error, there does appear a consensus about the potential food production which should result from measures to bring about an intensified and diversified agriculture. Coale and Hoover found reasonable estimates that food production could double within 25 years. In a study made of the Ganges-Brahmaputra basins, the F.A.O. concluded that a four-fold increase of agricultural production was feasible in the light of natural resources, assuming favourable conditions regarding the other factors mentioned earlier.

In fact, the Indian government planned for a doubling of production in 20 years, 1950–1970, which implies an annual growth rate far in excess of any yet achieved elsewhere. To quote Coale and Hoover again, "an average annual rate of growth of 3.8 per cent would be implied by this figure and the present official figures put it at 17 per cent over the first plan period and 16 per cent over the second." Early estimate for food-grain production increase for 1961–1962 is 2.3 per cent. Nevertheless, the figures in the table, extracted from the Third Five Year Plan, illustrate the great increases achieved. (See table.)

Increases have been recorded in other branches of agriculture, yet many blocks to the achievement of objectives remain. Some of these are of a technical nature arising from such proposals as increasing the volume of water available for controlled irrigation, increasing the manufacture of chemical fertilisers, producing a satisfactory heating and cooking substitute for the hand-patted cakes of cow dung, improving seed and animal strains. These require capital investment in buildings and plant or social investment in training skilled personnel, and often both. Planning these developments is relatively easy and subject to a number of caveats; the completion of the necessary infra-structure works, the production of seeds and fertilisers are likely to proceed roughly to schedule. In dealing with men and women in heterogeneous rural groups, problems of a different order arise.

II.

The Third Five Year Plan conveys the impression that the Government of India is unhappy about many aspects of its agricultural programme. During the previous five years, insufficient progress had been made in planning the supply and use of fertilisers, organic and green manures and improved seeds. "... Carefully worked out programmes for covering every acre of land enjoying irrigation or assured rainfall" had not been produced. Irrigated water had been used but tardily. Programs for the large-scale participation of the people had made only limited progress. These grounds for unease illustrate two major difficulties which any agricultural program in a developing country has to overcome: the inadequacy of the administrative structure and the problem of securing the acceptance by the people of the revolutionary changes involved in the program to increase production. Everything that has been postulated about potential technical resources has rested on one assumption—that the individuals concerned, those who actually farm the land, would make use of all these to the full. This assumption has no validity at the present stage of Indian development.

In the first place, the farmer's reluctance to change is based on fear. If he tries a new type of seed and the crop fails, who will provide food for his family until the next harvest, a year hence? Who will stave off the demands of the money lender if his land is mortgaged? The acceptance of fertilisers is growing, but their use is not without risk: if fertiliser is badly applied, roots burn and green paddy shoots turn yellow. Acquiring pesticides and fertilisers and better seed requires money: where is the credit for this to come from? If the money is forthcoming, can it be shown that this will yield a profit worth the risk of following new untrodden paths? Not least is the problem of illiteracy. New methods, new ways of scientific agriculture have to be personally demonstrated to those employed on the land, more than 80 million of them, spread over 550,000 villages.

Nor does the economic and social organization of the rural society help. In most states, the consolidation of land holdings has made little progress and cultivators have their holdings scattered over a number of small parcels and strips. Not only is this wasteful of land, boundary banks being necessary for example, and of effort, but it also inhibits new methods and the use of new equipment. Ploughs must be light enough to carry from one strip to another; the effective use of pesticides depends upon neighbouring strips similarly treated. Changes—even a new type of plough—might involve a radical alteration of the social structure. The final and insuperable obstacle to the introduction of a steel plough in one part of Uttar Pradesh was the likely ruin of the carpenters. Always ploughs—wooden ploughs—had been mended by the carpenters who had a continuing pattern of marriage relationships with the farmers. Relatives could not be treated in such a way, no matter what advantages accrued.

Then there is the use of water. Ignorance, prejudices, the obstacles of belief and customs, all affect any estimates of its use. The World Bank cautioned that investment in raising the Aswan dam would be economic only if the Egyptian peasants, used to dry cultivation or with nomadic habits, were taught how

to employ the water so that the soil did not crack in the dry period or become waterlogged in the growing time. One Indian village near the gigantic 16 mile-long Hirahud dam would not use the water for a second irrigated winter crop. The people put forward familiar excuses: "Paddy cannot grow a second time on the same soil; our main crop yield will fall; the water is without its electricity (growing power which, in their minds, had been removed by the hydro-electric turbines); where will our cattle graze?"

To overcome this, the local agricultural extension officer met superstition with a typical arational approach—he went on a hunger strike in the village temple until the villagers sowed the seed! The first three objections would have some supporters in many places; the last is most serious because of its wide applicability. It was certainly the view in much of Assam right in the Brahmaputra valley with its average annual rainfall of some 14 feet per cultivable acre. The pattern of agriculture was one crop only, followed in the "dry period," when drainage was still a problem, with the cattle roaming at will to pick up what feed they might from the remaining stubble and chaff. Yet most of the calculations that were made earlier were based on the use of water to provide perennial cultivation.

Once this was achieved, variation of crops followed to give a more valuable yield, more valuable both economically and dietetically. Here, too, practices are maddeningly restrictive and conservative. Thus in one Assamese village where Pakistani refugees have been settled, the newcomers are making a better living by growing vegetables than the local people do growing only paddy. The original inhabitants are adamant in their refusal to change. They have no experience; vegetables require more labour. But their main concern is with the dignity, or rather the indignity, of carrying the vegetables to market. The newcomers carry them in baskets on their heads or balanced on a carrying pole across their shoulders. "That we cannot do. It is below our dignity. We will have to hire a servant to do it; that would be expensive and he might

cheat us." Before we criticise too roundly, we of the West had better think of some of the things which *we* would not do—social dignity and status are not confined to the developing countries, but they are expensive luxuries in a subsistence society.

Examples of this and similar obstacles to change are innumerable; moreover they vary from village to village, district to district, state to state. Some are in terms of outmoded social custom, others turn on more rational situations which only a technical development can overcome. A typical example is the use of cow dung for fuel, and before this can be put back on the land a substitute for fuel must be found. Making compost of waste and refuse runs into social problems—who will carry it to the pits? Digging a pit to fill the target of an insistent official keeps him quiet, but who subsequently ensures that anything is put in or taken out of those pits? But enough has been said to support the case for self-generating change. Unless the motivation of the peasant overcomes both his personal fears and the inhibitions of the society in which he lives, no change will result.

III.

The over-all problem is not simply one of attitudes, important as these are. It is also one of logistics. Paper plans can end on the rocks of social resistance. But whatever their reception by the people, they can make no progress without an adequate system to produce and distribute all the components necessary for an increased agricultural program. Even at their present low rate of consumption, 1.6 million tons of chemical fertilisers have to be produced and distributed. Up to 1961, the area under improved seeds was reckoned at 55 million acres—the target for 1967 is over 200 million acres, and ultimately it can be nothing short of the total cultivated land. Pesticides will be required by 1967 for 50 million acres.

Figures of like size can be produced in every field of agricultural activity—irrigation, the provision of credit for the farmer, the securing of urban and rural compost—all these are vast tasks of production and distribution.

Furthermore, the distribution must be timely; sowing times wait upon the climate, not on man. There is an optimum time for the application of fertilisers and pesticides and under certain conditions neither can be used. Credit has to be available so that the individual sowing plan can be made in time and there must be sufficient local knowledge and pressure to avoid loans being used on marriage feasts and similar celebrations, of which one alone can encumber a family with debt for more than a lifetime.

These needs are recognised and the governments of India are extending their staff and seeking to improve their systems of administration and to build up a nation-wide system of producers' cooperatives. In view of the food crisis, agricultural development must occupy the major position in the program of rural development (80 per cent of the effort by development personnel previously and, since the Chinese threat 100 per cent). Yet India has rightly recognised that agricultural production involves almost every aspect of rural life. More effort depends on better health; an understanding of, and the will to use, new methods turn in the long run on education with its demands for teachers, schools and books. For its part better health depends on more doctors and dispensers, centres and sub-centres, more covered wells and tanks for clean drinking water, and more latrines and refuse facilities. Increased crop production requires roads and markets to get it away, and those roads are needed to bring fertilisers and pesticides and new ideas into the remote villages. These Kutchas—second-class—roads are largely a village community responsibility.

The vast irrigation schemes which must be planned in terms of the watershed and the river basin are of no avail unless their water is brought to the strips where the crops are to be grown. For this at least 40,000 miles of new channels must be dug each year, and the existing ones must be maintained. These must be planned and executed so as to synchronise with the availability of water in the main and subsidiary irrigation canals which are provided by the authority undertaking the main works. To carry out these minor works

requires the active participation by the people in both the preliminary planning and then in the construction of the channels themselves.

Much more evidence could be produced but no more is required to bring home the enormous size and varied range of the plan, and the minutely intimate nature of its detailed implementation in village communities and on the individual plot. To meet these two major aspects, the services in India are organised on a decentralised basis—the quasi-federal government at the centre has various functional departments—agriculture, health, education, for example—which make programs and stimulate counterpart departments in the states to accept, adapt and execute them in their own areas. To secure co-operation, there are grants of money from the centre, and conferences, training schemes and all-India cadres from which personnel are seconded to posts of importance in the states. Within the states, departments in the capitals have to rely on an extensive field organisation which works through divisions (3 to 7 million population), districts (300,000 to 1.5 million), blocks (60,000 to 80,000 population) and village circles (4,000 to 8,000 people).

Since 1952, much reliance has been placed on the activities of the Community Development Departments whose responsibility has been to give a sense of direction and urgency to the various departments engaged in rural development, and to stimulate a sense of self-help and self-reliance among the people which will make rural change acceptable, and, in fact, will generate social change of itself. Much has been done in this direction, but too often field officers have been over-anxious to fulfil targets at the expense of a long term investment in persuading the people to accept change. "Targetosis" has not produced that self-generating social change on which increased agricultural production in part depends.

IV.

To help overcome the atmosphere of official "foreign" pressure and to build up the resources of democracy, a bold system of local government is being substituted for the less

effective and less popularly based existing system. This creates councils of representatives at district, block and village levels, the first two being mostly indirectly elected by the last, itself directly elected. This is a bold attempt to make official organisations sensitive to local wishes, needs and conditions. While the two higher levels correspond to the similar levels of administration, and within the state plan are broadly in control of their activities, the basis of agricultural progress depends upon the acceptance and operation of new methods by villages, groups and individuals. As the Ford Foundation-sponsored Committee on India's Food Crisis pointed out:

It is clear that plans not accepted by those people who alone can carry them out, are only paper plans. To project more fertiliser use where farmers refuse to use more fertiliser is futile.

Today the stress is on the village meetings and village councils; if the leaders and the officers can drive home the need for, and the advantages of, change, then the villagers may be persuaded to act. The goals are more grain to meet their needs, and India's need, varied cropping, perennial cropping and all that these require. If farmers put forward their own targets and if communities exert pressure on raising these, and on fulfilling them, then changes will be forced upon the

reluctant. Once these are seen to be regularly successful, they will be self-perpetuating. Moreover, community effort is the key to more roads, more irrigation channels and the consolidation of holdings. In some areas where lay leadership and official stimulation have been really effective, the demands now made by the villagers on official services and supplies can be met only with difficulty. The district and block councils have been created to ensure smoother administrative services, to plan locally for the future in all aspects of linked development and to co-ordinate smaller areas. Roads and markets, water and health centres, schools and seed farms, adult literacy and female emancipation all require larger areas and wider vision than the village provides.

Here then are the administrative framework and the government institutions for expressing popular control. These are the essential concomitants of technical advance. Extensive plans are already in their first stages to give some training to the 2 to 3 million councillors and the quarter of a million secretaries and executive officers. Through this gigantic experiment in basic democracy, many leaders believe that they will strengthen the political base of Indian society and speed rural development at the same time. Community planning and support will sustain the timorous

(Continued on page 180)

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"Major economic changes in a society and economy like India's depend not only on national plans, with their emphasis upon rapid industrialization, but especially on the degree to which the nation fits into and is responsive to these plans."

Industrialization in India's Development

By WILFRED MALENBAUM

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IN DEVELOPING nations the industrial sectors of the economy tend to grow at more rapid rates than do other parts of the economy.* This is a consequence of two familiar forces. First, as persons attain higher levels of income, there is a relative increase in the proportion which industry provides in meeting their demands. There is literally no limit to the volume of the combined products of industry which nations can somehow use—in contrast to the products of agriculture, for example, where food production sooner or later encounters inelastic demands.

Secondly, in industry technology permits the ready combination of labor with increasing amounts of capital. With rapidly increasing amounts of machinery, output per man can expand. The larger the industrial sector the larger can be that sector's contribution to the national average output per man. It is thus not surprising that, in popular usage, industrialization and economic growth are treated almost synonymously. Rich nations have important percentages of their labor force, and of their total output, in modern industry; poor nations have high per-

centages in agriculture and related handicraft activities. These associations are familiar. Equally familiar is industrial might as a symbol of economic achievement: modern power facilities, steel mills, production of machines to make machines—these hold a special place in the popular version of economic progress.

These truths and associations have led to an emphasis on industrial expansion in programs which seek to convert static, underdeveloped economies to dynamic, developing economies. Thus all three of India's five-year plans—for 1951–1956, 1956–1961, and 1961–1966—project more rapid rates of growth in the "mining and manufacturing" category than in the other broad sectors of agriculture, of trade and of services. This emphasis emerges even more clearly when narrower categories are considered. For factory enterprises alone, India's Planning Commission projects rates of growth at very high levels: a 70 per cent increase in industrial production for 1956–1966 over 1960–1961. And finally, in any list of planned targets of production, the largest percentage gains are generally associated with the products of particular industries; a 445 per cent increase in the value of graded machine tools is planned for this same five-year period.¹

Yet neither the changing sectoral relationships in the case of past growth—in the United States, Western Europe or the Soviet Union, for example—nor these statements

* The term "industrialization" is used here to refer to the expansion of industry proper as one part of a changing economy. It is not used to refer to the expansion of the ratio of capital to labor in the economy generally. In the latter sense, industrialization and economic progress are identified by definition.

¹ See *Third Five Year Plan*, New Delhi, Government of India, August, 1961, pp. 55–56.

about the industrial emphasis of modern-day planning for growth in poor countries alter the fundamental fact that generating economic growth still remains evasive. Where economies are growing, the sectoral patterns change in the familiar way. But apparently more than building industry is required to start static economies on the paths of economic expansion and continuous growth. India's industrialization activities of recent years warrant examination in the light of these observations. What is the significance of India's industrialization record for the basic task of economic development?

THE CASE FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION

The case for industrial emphasis in India has been stated clearly by the Planning Commission.² The significance of the Planning Commission's statement lies in the recognition it gives to special claims for industry in the scale of investment and in the allocation of leadership interest and time, and in the role it imputes to industry as the catalytic force for change elsewhere in the economy. Through the greater skills and knowledge that must accompany it and through the interdependence inherent in specialized production processes, industry begets more industry, more services, more demand, more output. Industrialization rates an honored place in the strategy of initiating overall economic growth.

Nor does the thin base upon which modern industry rested in the pre-plan stage—only 5 or 6 per cent of India's national product came from modern manufacturing in 1950–1951—provide an excuse for a relatively small allocation to industry in the plan program. Even allocations of 10–15 per cent of the plan's total investment would seem high for such a small sector; actual allocations to industry (and power) exceeded 25 per cent in the second and third plans. The reason here is intimately related to the strategy argument above: the industry estimate in the national income accounts understates the true role of industry in the economy.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 24–25.

Thus, these estimates fail to reveal industry's close dependence upon agriculture, upon mining, and upon industry itself. Nor do the estimates do justice to the tight interconnections between industry on the one hand and power and transportation on the other. Many interrelated activities are involved in programs for industrial expansion. Practically all the investments in these areas are tied together in ways which mean complementary expansions in a fairly rigid time pattern. A new steel mill needs additional supplies of iron ore and of coal; it needs power; it needs transport facilities to bring the raw materials and to remove the finished products. Such binding interrelationships exist in both technical and temporal dimensions.

Apart from this "intrinsic" importance of industry in the economy, there is also the argument that certain forms of industrial expansion are essential if the Indian economy is ever to attain a self-sustaining basis for continuous expansion. If industrial growth was to continue to expand (at the rate of 7 per cent per year experienced in 1961, to say naught of the higher levels of the preceding years or of those projected for 1961–1966) India's needs for machinery for expansion and replacement would have to increase at corresponding or even somewhat higher rates. But today India still depends heavily upon imports: in real terms more than twice as much electrical and other machinery is now imported than is produced domestically in India.

Since India's traditional exports—tea, jute and cotton textiles—are not expected to increase at a significant rate (there is some question in official circles that exports will expand at all) it is argued that India will be able to assure continuing industrial expansion only through a much more rapid rate of expansion of its own machine-building activities.

THE RECORD OF EXPANSION

Such are the major arguments in support of the official emphasis and focus upon industrialization. What actually happened over the first decade of plan operation? Indus-

trial production in 1961 was almost 90 per cent above that of 1951.³ After a slow start—an average increase of about 3 per cent each year through 1954—"the annual rate of growth of industrial production . . . was between 7 per cent and 8 per cent for the period 1954–1956 (and) rose to nearly 12 per cent in 1960."⁴ Less specific projections for the next decade suggest essentially the maintenance of a rate of industrial growth exceeding 10 per cent each year,⁵ a goal which will of course be increasingly impressive as the very narrow base of India's industry expands.

The measure of expansion already attained understates India's industrial achievement, for it does not in itself reflect the growing diversity of production from India's machines. India gives the visitor familiar with India a decade back a visual impression of industrial change. He sees "made-in-India" products in use and for sale everywhere. He sees new construction, including new factories. He may see new industrial towns—especially those in which India's three new steel mills are located. India has become an exporter of industrial products, even to large industrial nations—sewing machines to the United States, for example. India's industrial production had by 1961 far exceeded

what was ever before attained—even during the war years when there was a marked curtailment of imports of certain manufactured goods. The recent record provides evidence of the high potential for industrial output in India—with its rich, low-cost resource endowments, a labor force adaptable to factory enterprise, and a growing corps of industrial and governmental leaders who can provide imaginative guidance and entrepreneurial skills.

While all this is true, it is also true that India's industrialization did not in itself achieve the industrial targets set by the Planning Commission. Nor, as we shall see below, has it yet had the impact anticipated on over-all development. Industrial targets were met to the extent of about 85 per cent during the Second Plan, the major shortfalls occurring in iron and steel and fertilizers, "... unfortunately . . . in some of the very industries which are of crucial importance . . . (depriving) the economy of benefits reckoned on for the start of the Third Plan."⁶

What might explain this lag in output relative to plan? Interestingly enough, the reason does not seem to have been the one most expected, namely, a shortfall of investment funds relative to what the plan visualized. On the contrary, some 30 per cent more was actually invested in industry during 1956–1961 than the second plan anticipated. In particular, the private sector was able to mobilize almost 40 per cent more for industrial expansion than was allocated in the official plan. This is worthy of some note, particularly since the "extra resources" seem to have come from such "typically private" types of financing sources as new stock issues of the corporations and various kinds of foreign capital.⁷

As this last suggests, the relative facility in resources for industry pertained for foreign purchasing power also. In this regard the problem, it seems, was more one of the timing of the foreign exchange availability than its supply, and a problem more for government than for private industry. (Over the five years of the second plan, India was able to exceed the planned international trade

³ As measured by the official Index of Industrial Production, prepared in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and published regularly in G. O. I., *Monthly Statistics of the Production of Selected Industries of India*. These data are conveniently available also in the *Reserve Bank of India Bulletin*, a monthly publication of the Reserve Bank of India. The index refers essentially to output from modern factory enterprise. Unless otherwise indicated, specific data on industrial output referred to in this paper are from this second source.

⁴ From a statement of P. C. Bhattacharyya, Governor of the Reserve Bank, reported in the *Bulletin*, August, 1962, p. 1196.

⁵ Based on projections of key commodities given, very preliminarily, in G.O.I. *Third Five-Year Plan*, New Delhi, August, 1961, p. 29.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 454. See also pp. 453–57 for other data in this paragraph.

⁷ Broadly, the Planning Commission estimated in 1961 that during 1956–1961 almost double the investment funds anticipated came from new issues (\$315 million as against \$168 million), from foreign private investors (\$420 million as against \$210 million) and from institutional agencies, largely the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (\$168 million as against \$85 million).

deficit by a margin of almost 80 per cent). Recent estimates present a fairly comprehensive picture of foreign investment in private industry in India for the years ending with 1960, itself a record year.

Some \$500 million was in fact added to private industry from abroad in those years (in contrast to the \$210 million or so anticipated). Almost one-third of this occurred in 1960, when investment in the petroleum industry jumped well above that of previous years. The United Kingdom remains the largest source of private overseas investment and is responsible for the recent spurt in petroleum investment. While United States citizens have expanded their relative importance in the private investment field, they still own less than 20 per cent of all foreign investment in India. In recent years, our annual inflow was just short of \$50 million.⁸

The Planning Commission itself places primary responsibility for the shortfall in industrial performance over the decade on the fact, in its terminology, "that the gestation period of a project . . . is generally longer than expected . . ."; it highlighted "the importance of (presumably more extensive) advanced planning." In part this last statement referred to the difference in plan as against actual costs. The three steel mills in the public sector for example were shown, in the *Second Five Year Plan*, to require a total investment of just under \$900 million. By the end of 1956, the total was raised to \$1.175 billion; the final cost of the three mills may exceed \$1.3 billion.⁹

In part, however, the official comment goes beyond problems of estimating costs. The very fact that interconnections and interdependences are so important in industrialization poses the alternatives either of a high degree of centralized plan implementation or of dependence upon the market for key economic decisions. How close the answers from these two alternative routes will be (and how easy it will be to operate in some combination of the two alternatives) depends

upon the extent to which the planned economic changes fit into the desires and motivations of pertinent segments of the population. In this area of popular response to economic stimuli the big explanation of plan shortfalls must be sought.

GROWTH

In recent years, India's plans have dealt explicitly with the entire economy, but only part of the investment program (above half in the late 1950's) has been directly implemented by government. Even today, about 90 per cent of India's national income arises from private activity. Inevitably then—and in varying degrees for different parts of the program—the "market" must play a large role in determining how fully the entire economy adopts the plan. Governmental powers are broad—from direct action, plant licensing and foreign exchange rationing through many less formal but direct influences to its general monetary, pricing and fiscal activities—but the importance of voluntary actions on the part of most of the people must not be underrated.

Much still depends upon the stimulus and response patterns which are meaningful to Indians today. These motivations—of individuals and groups—are of basic importance in projecting what the economy will yield. Major economic changes in a society and economy like India's depend not only on national plans, with their emphasis upon rapid industrialization, but especially on the degree to which the nation fits into and is responsive to these plans. It is because this responsiveness is slow that "the gestation period of projects" is lengthened.

Thus, India projected an expanding ratio for the "mining and manufacturing" sector in total national product. In 1950–1951, this broad sector was estimated to provide 17.2 per cent of this product; increases to 18.5 per cent by 1955–1956, to 21.6 per cent by 1960–1961 and to 23.1 per cent by 1965–1966 were projected at various times up to recently. This relative expansion as a growing percentage of total product meant a more rapid rate of growth than for the other large sec-

⁸ See Embassy of India in the United States *Indian News*, Dec. 21, 1962, p. 4.

⁹ See *Third Five Year Plan*, chapter XXVI.

tors. To date, this has not been achieved. Instead, the mining and manufacturing ratio has in total remained more or less unchanged since 1950–1951.

Within this total, factory enterprises have expanded relatively, but largely at the expense of the more traditional and small scale manufacturing. Even for modern factory enterprise alone, output in 1960–1961 was close to 8 per cent of total national product as against 6.5 per cent a decade earlier. The vast bulk of this production still comes from light and consumer industries operated in the private sector of the economy. In contrast to the relative growth anticipated in such hard areas as industry, the actual pattern of change showed a differential rate of progress in services, and in trade and transport. Together these broad sectors have expanded their relative importance in the economy between 1950–1951 and 1960–1961—developments quite out of keeping with the official expectations.¹⁰

The record of industrialization in India over the past decade is thus seen as a record of absolute achievement; perhaps also it provides an index of the potential which India has for future industrial expansion. On a relative basis, however, there has not yet been any marked surging forward of the industrial parts of the economy. Nor is there yet any clear evidence that India's industrialization efforts are reshaping the Indian economy into a new dynamic form. It has been argued that the differences between performance and expectation are more readily attributed to the pattern of indigenous responses in India than to any technical or quantitative shortage in the program and its implementation.¹¹ Some discussion is therefore warranted of the nature of these special patterns of indigenous response.

INITIATING GROWTH

Most theories and plans seeking a state of

continuous growth from a state of relative stagnation give primary emphasis to relieving certain shortages in the poor society. Much attention has been given to the vicious circles of poverty: low levels of output yield low levels of savings yield low levels of investment yield low levels of output. Clearly, there is need for a program which helps break the circle—through augmenting the low level of domestic savings by investment from abroad. But it is an oversimplification to focus primarily upon mitigating such shortages. This might be permissible if it were true that existing resources in the non-growing economy were being used effectively from an economic viewpoint, that the economy was in fact in a state of equilibrium at its low level of performance.

Actually, abundant labor tends to be overvalued in poor nations; labor goes unemployed where opportunities for its effective use seem to exist. Similarly, scarce capital tends to be undervalued; it is frequently allocated to what would seem to be low priority activities. In an economy and society where non-growth has long prevailed, people and institutions take on characteristics which serve to maintain the *status quo*. Thus the tendency to share income among members of extended families means that some form of income-sharing replaces allocation in accordance with contribution to output (the marginal productivity principles of the economic equilibrium). Furthermore, "low level equilibrium" conveys the impression of a poor nation as an essentially flat homogeneous plain of poverty and stagnation.

Actually we need to recognize that poor nations have—and have long had—many heights. The striking thing is the long-time continuation of this dualism. Within 25 miles of vast, modern metropolises like Calcutta and Bombay, for example, there are villages in which economic affairs are still conducted with little use of money as such. The tremendous changes which have left their mark on these large cities, over the past century, say, have not crossed these barriers to any significant extent. Major transport and communication innovations, major industrial

¹⁰ Arguments in this paragraph are developed fully in my *Prospects for Indian Development, passim*, but especially Chapter X and pp. 300–312.

¹¹ Again, a fuller statement is available in Part Three of my *Prospects for Indian Development*, pp. 207–288.

complexes, major financial reforms and improvements—all these have found a place in India's large cities. But their stimulating effect on most of the economy—the traditional sectors still absorb some three-quarters of the nation's work force—has been limited.

The exchanges between the modern and traditional parts of the nation are limited, highly institutionalized, or both, so that the points of contact fail to serve as real economic links that tend to bind the two components. The more static parts of the economy (primarily rural areas in most cases) supply surpluses to the other sectors and obtain goods and services from them. But these flows have had only small effects upon economic behavior in the traditional sectors. The traditional sectors "export" only a small percentage of total output and use only limited quantities of the goods and services produced in the modern sectors or abroad. These transactions are frequently conducted through trading institutions which serve to minimize the impact of any variations in the modern sector on the traditional. Thus, barter and non-monetized transactions continue to prevail in the production of goods (raw jute for example) which are produced in the traditional sectors primarily for processing (and export) in the modern sector.

Economic theory has in recent years begun to appreciate how critical for successful growth is the marriage of these two parts of the economy. Production in the traditional sector and goods and factor movement between sectors must increasingly take place in response to common economic considerations. Inevitably, this would expand the degree of dependence between the two, provide for greater efficiency of resource use and exploit the full supply and demand potential of the nation.

TRADITIONAL V. MODERN

But how can this be done? Dualism has served to prevent the interdependences associated with industrial investment from bridging the gap. Little reliance can be placed upon modern sector developments to pull the traditional parts of the economy

into modernity. Rather, direct action focused on the people and resources in the large traditional sectors is essential.

Such a focus runs into opposition from broadly-accepted doctrines of economic growth. Thus the general view is held that widening income inequalities are unfortunate necessities associated with the early stages of the growth process: only in this way will the economy be able to channel a large fraction of the expanding income into savings rather than consumption. From the economic point of view, the more investment in the modern, productive areas—where the feedback of new output to greater savings and further investment is very high—the better. So goes the argument. This seems to contrast with the position that, from the economic viewpoint, special efforts are needed on the less modern side of the economy.

Again, these different views need not be inconsistent, for they are argued from two different sets of assumptions. The familiar acceptance of inequalities is based on the assumption that all sectors of the economy are integral parts of the whole: inequalities in returns reflect the inequalities of contribution to output. But, as we argued above, in the usual situation, the two parts do not comprise an integral whole, and the economy suffers from this separation. Only through a program that reduces the degree of separation will there be a gain to the total. More realistic assumptions put a premium upon action to eliminate inequalities.

Similarly, there is a difference of view with respect to the emphasis given to savings as against consumption in an economy in the early stages of growth. When the policy focuses on maximizing resources for investment, expansion in savings becomes a high priority objective. But when policy recognizes the need to tie the two parts of the economy together more closely, output increases which go into consumption are welcome. Thus, one way to increase the participation of the traditional sector in the total economy may be to encourage the development of consumption habits similar to those of the modern sector. Only then can there

be a greater receptivity in these sectors to the expanding output potential in the modern sector.

Does this mean, then, that the scarce resources now available for investment will need to be diverted to greater consumption (or from producing machines which produce machines, to producing machines which produce more consumer goods)? It may, but here again action can benefit from a better understanding of the nature of the dual structure. In both sectors, resources tend to be underutilized; this is especially true for the traditional sector. The new emphasis would seek to activate these resources in order to provide additional output; part of this would in turn serve this consumption objective.

Indeed, there is perhaps no clearer illustration of the limitations of present development policy in India than that provided by the growth in unemployment and underemployment in rural areas, despite the need for the output these unemployed could help produce; and in the urban areas where limited responses provide too few jobs. Nor is there any prospect, under present development policies, for a reduction in the still expanding ratio of unemployment.

NEW TASKS

The problems of mounting unemployment in India can serve as a convenient transition point for discussing new emphases in planning and program implementation. The phenomenon of unemployment in this poor country, with many needs for goods that additional labor can produce, is a clear index of the limited effects of the present program. Familiar doctrines on growth hold that, under the conditions prevailing in poor societies, high employment targets are not consistent with high output targets; and it is the latter which should be set as an objective. This argument is meaningful in the context of the hypothetical poor country, in a low level equilibrium situation. In such a case, it may not be efficient to combine a given amount of capital with many workers; the initial goal should be the maximum output, whatever the employment effect. But in the real world of

dualistic poor nations, with their underutilized resources, this argument is not meaningful. With appropriate organization, both high employment and high output become possible.

Concern about employment will inevitably focus interest on the traditional sector, which has most of the labor force. With the limited scope over the next years for large increases in employment (relative to the size of the labor force in India) in the urban and modern areas, this will also turn interest to more effective use of manpower in the traditional, and generally the rural, parts of the nation. With leadership and imagination, India's rural areas can be made not only to expand their agricultural product, but also to improve their roads and irrigation facilities, and to increase by a wide margin the variety and quantity of rural consumption.

Many of these expansions can be achieved without significant additional capital of the kind used to expand modern industrial output. Insofar as this is true, India can place much more emphasis on the traditional parts of the economy without altering to any great extent the magnitude of the effort in the modern industrial sector. The qualification here of course is the government's need to provide leadership and organization in the more backward sectors. This would mean a transfer from present leadership allocation in the modern parts of the economy. But the private business sector can in considerable measure take over this role in the modern sector. If government does not take the initiative in the poorer areas, there is no other source—at least initially—for top guidance.

To date, India's programs directed at the

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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

The State of the Union Message

On January 14, 1963, President John F. Kennedy delivered his State of the Union message to a joint session of Congress. The complete text of sections I, II and III of his message follows:

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the 88th Congress:

I congratulate you all—not merely on your electoral victory but on your selected role in history. For you and I are privileged to serve the Great Republic in what could be the most decisive decade of its life. The choices we make, for good or ill, may well shape the state of the Union for generations yet to come.

Little more than a hundred weeks ago I assumed the office of President. In seeking the help of the Congress and my countrymen, I pledged no easy answers. I pledged—and asked—only toil and dedication. These the Congress and the people have given in good measure. And today, having witnessed in recent months a heightened respect for our national purpose and power—having seen the courageous calm of a united people in a perilous hour—and having observed a steady improvement in the opportunities and well-being of our citizens—I can report to you that the state of this old but youthful Union, in the 175th year of its life, is good.

In the world beyond our borders, steady progress has been made in building a world of order. The people of West Berlin remain both free and secure. A settlement, though still precarious, has been reached in Laos. The spearpoint of aggression has been blunted in Viet Nam. The end of agony may be in sight in the Congo. The doctrine of troika is dead. And, while danger continues, a deadly threat has been removed from Cuba.

At home, the recession is behind us. Well over a million more men and women are working today than were working two years ago. The average factory work week is once again more than 40 hours; our industries are turning out more goods than ever before; and more than half of the manufacturing capacity that lay silent and wasted 100 weeks ago is humming with activity.

In short, both at home and abroad, there may now be a temptation to relax. For the road has been long, the burden heavy, and the pace consistently urgent.

But we cannot be satisfied to rest here. This is the side of the hill, not the top. The mere absence of war is not peace. The mere absence of recession is not growth. We have made a beginning—but we have only begun.

Now the time has come to make the most of our gains—to translate the renewal of our national strength into the achievement of our national purpose.

II

America has enjoyed 22 months of uninterrupted economic recovery. But recovery is not enough. If we are to prevail in the long run, we must expand the long-run strength of our economy. We must move along the path to a higher rate of growth and full employment.

For this would mean tens of billions of dollars more each year in production, profits, wages and public revenues. It would mean an end to the persistent slack which has kept

unemployment at or above 5 per cent for 61 out of 62 months—and an end to the growing pressures for such restrictive measures as the 35-hour week, which alone could increase hourly labor costs by as much as 14 per cent, start a new wage-price spiral of inflation, and undercut our efforts to compete with other nations.

To achieve these greater gains, one step, above all, is essential—the enactment this year of a substantial reduction and revision in federal income taxes.

For it is increasingly clear—to those in government, business and labor who are responsible for our economy's success—that our obsolete tax system exerts too heavy a drag on private purchasing power, profits and employment. Designed to check inflation in earlier years, it now checks growth instead. It discourages extra effort and risk. It distorts the use of resources. It invites recurrent recessions, depresses our federal revenues, and causes chronic budget deficits.

Now, when the inflationary pressures of the war and post-war years no longer threaten, and the dollar commands new respect—now, when no military crisis strains our resources—now is the time to act. We cannot afford to be timid or slow. For this is the most urgent task confronting the Congress in 1963.

In an early message, I shall propose a permanent reduction in tax rates which will lower liabilities by \$13.5 billion. Of this, \$11 billion results from reducing individual tax rates, which now range between 20 and 91 per cent, to a more sensible range of 14 to 65 per cent, with a split in the present first bracket. Two and one-half billion dollars results from reducing corporate tax rates, from 52 per cent—which gives the Government today a majority interest in profits—to the permanent pre-Korean level of 47 per cent. This is in addition to the more than \$2 billion cut in corporate tax liabilities resulting from last year's investment credit and depreciation reform.

To achieve this reduction within the limits of a manageable budgetary deficit, I urge: first, that these cuts be phased over three calendar years, beginning in 1963 with a cut

of some \$6 billion at annual rates; second, that these reductions be coupled with selected structural changes, beginning in 1964, which will broaden the tax base, end unfair or unnecessary preferences, remove or lighten certain hardships, and in the net offset some \$3.5 billion of the revenue loss; and third, that budgetary receipts at the outset be increased by \$1.5 billion a year, without any change in tax liabilities, by gradually shifting the tax payments of large corporations to a more current time schedule. This combined program, by increasing the amount of our national income, will in time result in still higher federal revenues. It is a fiscally responsible program—the surest and soundest way of achieving in time a balanced budget in a balanced full employment economy.

This net reduction in tax liabilities of \$10 billion will increase the purchasing power of American families and business enterprises in every tax bracket, with the greatest increase going to our low-income consumers. It will, in addition, encourage the initiative and risk-taking on which our free system depends—induce more investment, production, and capacity use—help provide the 2 million new jobs we need every year—and reinforce the American principle of additional reward for additional effort.

I do not say that a measure for tax reduction and reform is the only way to achieve these goals.

—No doubt a massive increase in federal spending could also create jobs and growth—but, in today's setting, private consumers, employers and investors should be given a full opportunity first.

—No doubt a temporary tax cut could provide a spur to our economy—but a long-run problem compels a long-run solution.

—No doubt a reduction in either individual or corporation taxes alone would be of great help—but corporations need customers and job seekers need jobs.

—No doubt tax reduction without reform would sound simpler and more attractive to many—but our growth is also hampered by a host of tax inequities and special preferences which have distorted the flow of investment.

—And, finally, there are no doubt some who would prefer to put off a tax cut in the hope that ultimately an end to the Cold War would make possible an equivalent cut in expenditures—but that end is not in view and to wait for it would be costly and self-defeating.

In submitting a tax program which will, of course, temporarily increase the deficit but can ultimately end it—and in recognition of the need to control expenditures—I will shortly submit a fiscal 1964 administrative budget which, while allowing for needed rises in defense, space and fixed interest charges, holds total expenditures for all other purposes below this year's level.

This requires the reduction or postponement of many desirable programs—the absorption of a large part of last year's Federal pay raise through personnel and other economies—the termination of certain installations and projects—and the substitution in several programs of private for public credit. But I am convinced that the enactment this year of tax reduction and tax reform over-shadows all other domestic problems in this Congress. For we cannot lead for long the cause of peace and freedom, if we ever cease to set the pace at home.

III

Tax reduction alone, however, is not enough to strengthen our society, to provide opportunities for the four million new Americans who are born every year, to improve the lives of the 32 million Americans who still live on the outskirts of poverty.

The quality of American life must keep pace with the quantity of American goods.

This country cannot afford to be materially rich and spiritually poor.

Therefore, by holding down the budgetary cost of existing programs to keep within the limitations I have set, it is both possible and imperative to adopt other new measures that we cannot afford to postpone.

These measures are based on a series of fundamental premises, grouped under four related headings:

First, we need to strengthen our nation by investing in our youth:

—The future of any country which is dependent on the will and wisdom of its citizens is damaged, and irreparably damaged, whenever any of its children is not educated to the fullest of his capacity, from grade school through graduate school. Today, an estimated 4 out of every 10 students in the fifth grade will not even finish high school—and that is a waste we cannot afford.

—In addition, there is no reason why one million young Americans, out of school and out of work, should all remain unwanted and often untrained on our city streets when their energies can be put to good use.

—Finally, the overseas success of our Peace Corps volunteers, most of them young men and women carrying skills and ideals to needy people, suggests the merit of a similar corps serving our own community needs: in mental hospitals, on Indian reservations, in centers for the aged or for young delinquents, in schools for the illiterate or the handicapped. As the idealism of our youth has served world peace, so can it serve the domestic tranquility.

Second, we need to strengthen our nation by safeguarding its health:

—Our working men and women—instead of being forced to beg for help from public charity once they are old and ill—should start contributing now to their own retirement health program through the Social Security System.

—Moreover, all our miracles of medical research will count for little if we cannot reverse the growing nation-wide shortage of doctors, dentists and nurses, and the widespread shortages of nursing homes and modern urban hospital facilities. Merely to keep the present ratio of doctors and dentists from declining any further, we must over the next ten years increase the capacity of our medical schools by 50 per cent and our dental schools by 100 per cent.

—Finally, and of deep concern, I believe that the abandonment of the mentally ill and the mentally retarded to the grim mercy of custodial institutions too often inflicts on them and on their families a needless cruelty which

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BOOK REVIEWS

ON INDIA AND ASIA

ASIA IN THE EUROPEAN AGE 1498-1955. BY MICHAEL EDWARDES. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. 351 pages, maps, index, \$8.50.)

In a history of the European impact upon the countries of Asia, the author states that "no real synthesis was accomplished in Asia's European Age. The peoples who learned from the West learned only sufficient to ensure the end of imperialism itself."

This is a valuable study of the effects of Western ideas and institutions upon Asia.

NEHRU. A PICTORIAL BIOGRAPHY. BY MICHAEL EDWARDES. (New York: The Viking Press, 1962. 136 illustrations. 143 pages, chronology, notes, index, \$6.50.)

The text of this well-illustrated commentary on the life of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru lacks the vitality of the pictures. The author follows Nehru from early childhood through his emergence as India's great political leader. The primary emphasis of the book is on India's struggle for independence and Nehru's involvement with the struggle and with Mahatma Gandhi.

LAND AND LABOUR IN INDIA. BY DANIEL and ALICE THORNER. (New York & Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1962. 227 pages and index, \$8.50.)

This book is a collection of 15 essays on the economies of land and labor in India. The study is divided into three sections: "Land and Labour," deals with the agrarian problem; "Trends" covers the historical background of Indian economic life during the past 200 years; "Censuses and

Sample Surveys" evaluates "statistical data bearing on the current agrarian situation."

INDIA'S URBAN FUTURE. EDITED BY ROY TURNER. (Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1962. 470 pages and index, \$7.00.)

The papers presented in this volume originally were prepared for a week-long seminar in the summer of 1962 (to which both Westerners and Indians were invited), on the problem of urbanization, using India as "a good case for analysis." The book contains excellent detailed studies of the impact of urbanization on Indian society. The 23 articles are organized in four major sections: "Changes in the Urban Population"; "Urban Structure and Urban Society"; "Urbanization and Economic Development"; and "Government and Planning"; plus a "Conclusion." Among the distinguished contributors are Richard L. Park, Bert F. Hoselitz and Tarlok Singh.

CASTE TODAY. BY TAYA ZINKIN. (London: Institute of Race Relations and Oxford University Press, 1962. 69 pages, \$1.50.)

In this excellent and well-written study of the caste system of India, the author has provided the reader, particularly the Western reader, with new insight into the complexity of Indian society. Caste, as defined by the author, provides "... a network of observances covering every action of daily life," including the most minute detail, i.e., even governing "the length of the twig with which one cleans one's teeth."

Although both the government and the Westernized youth of India are trying to undermine the caste system, the author

predicts that it will be a long time before the taboo of "pollution" can be finally eradicated.

RAJENDRA PRASAD. By KEWAL L. PANJABI. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1962. 208 pages, glossary and index, \$3.50.)

This account of the life and career of the President of India reflects the author's personal admiration for the man who is "an ideal President," "respected and loved for his intense devotion to the country, his integrity of character and purity of life."

KRISHNA MENON. By EMIL LENGYEL. (New York: Walker & Co., 1962. 253 pages and index, \$5.00.)

In an informative biography of Krishna Menon, India's controversial ex-minister of defense, Lengyel observes that "through every . . . available means, Krishna Menon pursued the goal of Indian independence with single-minded fanaticism." ". . . His fixed obsession was the extirpation of colonial rule in India."

The book assesses Menon's contribution to India. The author presents the viewpoints of Menon's critics and supporters, and outlines the basis for the animosity Krishna Menon has inspired at home and overseas.

T.H.B.

HISTORY AND POLITICS

CONCISE DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN HISTORY. Edited by THOMAS C. COCHRAN and WAYNE ANDREWS. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962. 1,046 pages and index, \$19.50.)

An abridged version of the definitive five-volume *Dictionary of American History* published in 1940 under the editorship of James Truslow Adams, this *Concise Dictionary* with more than 2,200 articles is a welcome addition for a reference library. Its authoritative articles make it a brief one-volume encyclopedia.

T.H.B.

THE TWO FACES OF TASS. By THEODORE E. KRUGLAK. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962. 263 pages, appendixes and index, \$5.00).

The New York Times of November 3, 1961, carried a short news item with an Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, dateline, which noted that "six dispatches by TASS, the Soviet press agency, filled seventy-six column-inches in today's issue of the Government daily newspaper, *The Ethiopian Herald*. All the dispatches except one were datelined Moscow. . . . The TASS dispatches are supplied free to the press by the Soviet Embassy." For underdeveloped countries, unable to afford the services of Western news services, the Soviet offer of free news and information hand-outs serves a useful function.

T. E. Kruglak, long associated with the profession of journalism, has written an informative, readable account of the background, organization and functions of TASS. He notes that TASS, "in essence, is the creature of the top Soviet leadership," but adds that this need not act as a bar to coexistence and cooperation with Western news agencies. Tracing the evolution of TASS, he discusses the operation of TASS correspondents in Western countries, particularly the United States, and examines the way in which TASS treats news about America. "No evidence has been adduced," he writes, "to indicate that TASS correspondents are engaged in cloak-and-dagger sidelines in the United States. . . . The general trend in Soviet journalism . . . the job of supplying accurate news and producing it quickly, leaves little time for outside activities in the area of espionage." However, he acknowledges that there may be exceptions. He calls for practicing coexistence with TASS-men on the assumption that changing conditions in the U.S.S.R. and the apparent willingness of the Kremlin to permit the Agency to function as a legitimate news-gathering institution raise the hope that TASS will increasingly evolve into a news organization engaged in providing the Soviet people with realistic appraisals of developments in the non-Communist world.

A.Z.R.

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INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES

(Continued from page 134)

"Friends in Need," meaning that friends in need were friends indeed. A recent poll of public opinion conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion in New Delhi showed "a great intensity in favourable attitudes towards the U.S.A. and a substantial, though less intensive, trend towards Britain." What is even more important in terms of long-term effects, the Chinese invasion has caused, to quote B. K. Nehru, Indian Ambassador at Washington, "a turmoil in Indian political thought"; and one can safely predict that Indian foreign policy can never again be the same.

NON-ALIGNMENT AND THE U.S.S.R.

If India still adheres to her policy of non-alignment, it is because the Soviet Union has consistently pursued a policy of neutrality during these years of growing conflict and recent war between India and China. In fact, while the war was still going on, Frol Kozlov, one of Khrushchev's deputies, made a speech in Italy in which he sharply criticised the Chinese for their aggression against India. This is perhaps the first instance of one Communist country accusing another of aggression against a non-Communist country.

It is clear that the rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China, already wide for other reasons, has become wider as a result of the Soviet attitude towards the Sino-Indian conflict. And the wider it becomes, the better the future not only for India and the South-east Asian nations but for the entire free world. This is as clearly understood in the United States today as it is in India. When Averell Harriman was recently (December 9, 1962) asked whether the United States had any objection to India's receiving military aid from the Soviet Union, he said: "No, none at all. . . . It is very much to our interests as well as to India's interests for them (Indians) to maintain as friendly relations as they can with Moscow."

Clearly Indo-American relations have reached a point of maturity; the future can be faced with some confidence.

CHINA: JEALOUS NEIGHBOR

(Continued from page 140)

Asian horizon. Nehru had acquired a status all too disproportionate with the military and economic strength of his country. While the Chinese, pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, were building their country through sweat and toil and tears, the Indians instead substituted foreign aid and seemed to get along merrily with both blocs. The United States was busy getting together an international consortium to finance India's development projects, while the Soviet Union also seemed determined to take a large hand in the industrialization of India. A non-aligned India, as a working democracy, politically stable and economically viable (at least increasingly so), was a threat, a challenge, an enemy. It became the function of China's policy to humble and discredit Nehru, debunk India's non-alignment and destroy India's power and position.

What is surprising is that the Indian government should not have been aware of the situation earlier. For the last three years China's increasing hostility to India was becoming evident. While it is true that the entire world was surprised and shocked at the unabashed invasion of India, the Government should have been better prepared. The attack on India was motivated by cold, brutal calculations: to assert Peking's power and presence in the Himalayas, to destroy India's prestige and humble Nehru, to establish the position of China as the only real power in Asia, to tell Khrushchev (who had been unsparing in his efforts to cultivate the "Indian reactionaries headed by Mr. Nehru" at the expense of his Chinese "brothers") to stew in his own juice and, finally, to serve notice to the world powers there could be no peace in the world unless China was accepted and treated as a peer.

INDIA'S BATTLE FOR FOOD

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individual; service to the local group and the national effort by planning and growing more food will motivate him. This must be accompanied by better education and health services and the development of rural industries as alternatives to agricultural work. The land is already overstaffed, and there should be no increase in the people on it. In short, there is a challenge; there is support and there is motivation. This may succeed among a people to whom the personal profit motive alone, because of its smallness and its proportionately high risk, is inadequate to promote change for those to whom the ways of nature and the social tradition are immutable.

Problems there are in plenty in doubling, trebling and quadrupling agricultural output. Some of the most important have been outlined here. Setbacks and great difficulties have been experienced and for those who expected dramatic immediate results, this has been disappointing and proof (for opponents) that the development program has failed. This in itself is wrong, as the figures for grain production show. But the real basis of error is to expect to change a rural people in less than three generations. Rural India has been no more than prodded into a drowsy awakening; the stretching of her limbs and the leap forward is yet to come. And it will come not by dragooning nor by force but in the surest way of all: because the people themselves, as individuals, wish it. That food production could be greatly increased has been known to scientists for decades. What man has yet to learn is how to deal with the human problems of development and change. India has faith in her ability to achieve this; in so doing she provides the world's greatest laboratory in the social sciences.

INDUSTRIALIZATION

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less-advantaged areas have received less at-

tention and lower priority from the top leadership. Only when this emphasis changes can there be some hope for real success in improving economic growth in these sectors. And such improvement is essential if India's industrialization is to provide the base for continuous and self-sustaining economic expansion for the nation as a whole.

STATE OF THE UNION MESSAGE

(Continued from page 176)

this nation should not endure. The incidence of mental retardation in this country is three times as high as that of Sweden, for example—and that figure can and must be reduced.

Third, we need to strengthen our nation by protecting the basic rights of its citizens:

—The right to competent counsel must be assured to every man accused of crime in Federal Court, regardless of his means.

—And the most precious and powerful right in the world, the right to vote in a free American election, must not be denied to any citizen on grounds of his race or color. I wish that all qualified Americans permitted to vote were willing to vote—but surely, in this Centennial year of Emancipation, all those who are willing to vote should always be permitted.

Fourth, we need to strengthen our nation by making the best and the most economical use of its resources and facilities:

—Our economic health depends on healthy transportation arteries; and I believe the way to a more modern, economical choice of national transportation service is through increased competition and decreased regulation. Local mass transit, faring even worse, is as essential a community service as hospitals and highways. Nearly three-fourths of our citizens live in urban areas, which occupy only 2 per cent of our land—and if local transit is to survive and relieve the congestion of these cities, it needs federal stimulation and assistance.

—Next, this government is in the storage and stockpile business to the melancholy tune

of more than \$16 billion. We must continue to support farm income, but we should not pile more farm surpluses on top of the \$7.5 billion we already own. We must maintain a stockpile of strategic materials, but the \$8.5 billion we have acquired—for reasons both good and bad—is much more than we need; and we should be empowered to dispose of the excess in ways which will not cause market disruption.

—Finally, our already overcrowded national parks and recreation areas will have twice as many visitors ten years from now. If we do not plan today for the future growth of these and other great natural assets—not only parks and forests but wildlife and wilderness preserves, and water projects of all kinds—our children and their children will be poorer in every sense of the word.

These are not domestic concerns alone. For upon our achievement of greater vitality and strength at home hang our fate and future in the world—our ability to sustain and supply the security of free men and nations—our ability to command their respect for our leadership—our ability to expand our trade without threat to our balance of payments—and our ability to adjust to the changing demands of Cold War competition and challenge.

We shall be judged more by what we do at home than what we preach abroad. Nothing we could do to help the developing countries would help them half as much as a booming U.S. economy. And nothing our opponents could do to encourage their own ambitions would encourage them half as much as a lagging U.S. economy. These domestic tasks do not divert energy from our security—they provide the very foundation for freedom's survival and success.

BOOK REVIEWS

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RUSSIA UNDER KHRUSHCHEV. EDITED BY ABRAHAM BRUMBERG. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962. 660 pages,

\$8.75; also available in paperback, \$2.50.)

This anthology of articles, taken from the bimonthly journal *Problems of Communism*, published by the United States Information Agency, is the answer to one instructor's search for high quality supplementary material which can be used in a course on Soviet Government. I have no doubt that it will find a wide and welcome reception. Brumberg has organized his rich material into topical sections: The Ideological Setting; The Politics of the Struggle for Power; The Economy: Problems and Prospects; The Society; The Literary Scene; Miscellanea (which include excellent pieces on Soviet law, historiography, and theatre); and Whither Russia?—a series of analyses and speculations about the future orientation of Soviet society.

The writers of the articles represent a cross-section of the ablest Western commentators on the Soviet Union: Raymond Aron, Alexander Dallin, Merle Fainsod, Alex Inkeles, Leon Lipson, Richard Lowenthal, Bertram D. Wolfe, to mention some of the contributors.

In the preface, the editor notes that the articles "provide a chronological and thematic commentary on internal developments in the U.S.S.R., ranging from the changes in the official ideology to the latest developments in Soviet agriculture. They constitute, essentially, a report on what might be called 'the Khrushchev era.' At the same time, it is hoped that they will broaden the reader's comprehension not only of what is new in the Soviet Union, but also of what is old; not only of what is changing, but of what has remained the same—reforms, upheavals, purges, and sputniks notwithstanding." Abraham Brumberg is to be commended for his judicious selections. And the publisher, Frederick Praeger, is to be congratulated for his good sense in making this meaty volume available in paperback so that it may enjoy the widest possible use.

A.Z.R.

MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE. EDITED BY FRANKLIN MARK OSANKA. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962. 519 pages, bibliography and index, \$6.50.)

The problem of guerrilla warfare has become a major concern in Laos, South Vietnam, Cuba, and elsewhere in underdeveloped areas. It is attracting the increasing attention of Western leaders and has ramifications in the political, economic, as well as military, spheres. This compilation of articles by practitioners and theorists of guerrilla warfare places its emphasis on Communist movements. It ranges far and wide, including pieces dealing with revolutionary movements in the U.S.S.R., Communist China, the Philippines, Greece, Indochina, Malaya, Cuba, and Algeria, and represents a valuable addition to our knowledge of this crucial subject.

The articles by the contributors represent an impressive accumulation of experiences and investigations. However, greater use of extracts from the writings of Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, and others, might have been included.

A.Z.R.

India and the Commonwealth

(Continued from page 159)

rage. Yet he did not threaten a reassessment of the Commonwealth link as he had done in 1957. Certainly his discomfort over British behavior seemed no less acute, and was even considerably stirred up over the added strain caused by the Goa affair and the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. After all, it was Nehru who—on the day after the Kashmir question went once again into limbo in the Security Council—registered loudly his “deep regret” that Britain and the United States were “almost invariably against us” on matters that created passionate feelings in India, “such as Goa and Kashmir.”

Ultimately, the new tentativeness in India's attitude toward the Commonwealth is the

product of the bewildering march of changes in its foreign policy and international attitudes. At the present time, India is probably no less surprised that it is engaged in a hot and ominous border war with Communist China than it is that it is negotiating with its one-time major enemy, Commonwealth associate Pakistan, and moving cautiously toward solving the Kashmir problem. Even if these negotiations fail, the important point is that for the first time in 15 years India and Pakistan were willing to sit together and try to negotiate a solution.

A NEW TENTATIVENESS

The tentativeness is also due to a vague uncertainty regarding relations with the new African states. Indeed, one of the greater squabbles in the 1961 Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers was between Nkrumah and Nehru over the method of handling the Congo problem. Nkrumah argued, and Nehru disagreed, that this was an African problem and should be solved by Africans, and Africans alone. Indeed, Ghana's general behavior—both internally and externally, particularly its friendly relations with India's new-found enemy, Communist China—has not contributed to India's appreciation of its African partners in the Commonwealth of Nations.

Finally, and most important, the tentativeness is a result of uncertainty as to the future of the Commonwealth if Britain becomes integrated into the Common Market. Up to the present, Nehru and his colleagues have been inclined to regard the Common Market as something of an enemy, something constructed to serve the European powers at the expense of the underdeveloped world. To them it will become more of an enemy if it succeeds in diverting Britain from its concern with the underdeveloped world of Asia and Africa. In short, this is not the time to pinpoint or assess India's role in the Commonwealth, except historically. Too many contingencies form a constellation of question marks—most of them centered around the still unresolved problem of Britain's relationship to the Common Market.

The Month In Review

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of January, 1963, to give a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin

- Jan. 2—The new American Commander in Berlin, Major General James H. Polk, takes over from Major General Albert Watson. Polk affirms U.S. determination "to guarantee the freedom of the city."
- Jan. 9—The Ford Foundation (a U.S. organization) announces a \$2 million grant for the support of artistic, cultural and educational programs in West Berlin.

Disarmament

- Jan. 12—The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. formally notify members of the 18-nation disarmament committee of the resumption of the Geneva talks on February 12.
- Jan. 14—Private discussions between Russian and U.S. disarmament negotiators open in New York.
- Jan. 20—It is reported in Washington that the U.S.S.R. has offered to allow 2 or 3 on-site inspections annually in Russian territory to enforce a nuclear test ban treaty. Three automatic seismic stations could also be installed on Soviet territory.
- Jan. 22—The French government reveals plans for a nuclear force are continuing despite a Soviet request that France join a nuclear test ban treaty.
- In a Voice of America broadcast, Jerome Weisner, the President's science advisor, suggests that a compromise may be worked out between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on nuclear test ban inspection.
- Jan. 31—U.S.-British-Russian talks in New York on a nuclear test ban treaty end in failure.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

- Jan. 7—West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder asks negotiators to take a "positive" attitude toward Britain's application for membership in the Common Market (E.E.C.).
- Jan. 14—French President Charles de Gaulle in a news conference suggests that Britain should not seek full membership in the E.E.C. and advocates "association" status for Britain. (See also *France*, Jan. 14 and Jan. 24.)
- Jan. 18—France agrees to attend one more session on British entry into the Common Market. An official statement notes France's request that negotiations with Britain should be suspended.
- Jan. 23—France and West Germany agree to try to avoid an immediate termination of the negotiations for Britain's entry into the Common Market; they call for a commission to study the negotiations and suggest possible solutions of outstanding differences.
- Jan. 26—President Kennedy's special representative for trade negotiations, Christian Herter, ends "exploratory talks," the first of a series of negotiations on tariff reduction between the U.S. and the E.E.C.
- French President de Gaulle tells Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag that Denmark can choose full or associate membership in the Common Market, if negotiations with Britain fail.
- Jan. 28—A closed session of the Common Market nations begins. French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville reportedly is willing to let the negotiations end peacefully, but will not consider con-

tinuing a discussion of Britain's application for membership.

Jan. 29—Negotiations dealing with Britain's entry into the Common Market end in failure after 16 months, when France refuses to continue the discussions.

European Free Trade Association (EFTA)

Jan. 29—EFTA announces that ministers of its members will meet in Geneva Feb. 18 to evaluate the changes rising out of Britain's failure to gain entry in the Common Market.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)

Jan. 2—General Lyman L. Lemnitzer assumes supreme command of Nato's European forces.

Jan. 28—In Paris the U.S. begins exploratory discussions of a multi-national nuclear force for Nato. France has rejected the Anglo-American offer to participate in a nuclear Nato force. (See also *France*, Jan. 14.)

Organization of American States

Jan. 7—U.S. delegate to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson tells a secret session of the O.A.S. Council that crisis negotiations on Cuba between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have ended.

United Nations

Jan. 4—The U.N. Secretary General's office reveals that the U.N. is abandoning its news broadcasts in Hungarian. Initiated after the revolution of 1956, these broadcasts to Hungarian listeners have been criticized by the Communists.

Jan. 5—Nikolai T. Fedorenko arrives at the U.N. to succeed Valerian A. Zorin as chief U.N. delegate from the U.S.S.R.

Jan. 7—In a joint letter to the U.N. Secretary General, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reveal that they regard the Cuban crisis as ended.

Jan. 19—U Thant asks members for voluntary contributions to cover the \$19 million expense for civilian operations in the Congo.

Jan. 27—It is reported by *The New York Times* that France has told U Thant she will not pay her full share of payments of principal and interest on U.N. bonds authorized by the General Assembly to meet deficit costs of the military operations in the Middle East and the Congo. France maintains that only the Security Council can make assessments for these peace-keeping operations.

Jan. 29—U Thant says that bilateral aid may now be furnished to the Congo without using U.N. channels.

U Thant warns that the tension in Brunei in Southeast Asia may create a major trouble spot.

ALGERIA

Jan. 17—Ben Bella opens independent Algeria's first trade union conference, the congress of the Algerian Labor Federation (U.G.T.A.). Ben Bella declares that the Federation will have "internal autonomy," but will be directed politically by the Political Bureau.

Jan. 19—On the third day of the Labor Federation's first convention, the Political Bureau of the National Liberation Front takes control of the Federation. The Federation's Provisional Executive Committee is replaced by union delegates handpicked by the Political Bureau.

It is reported that France and Algeria have agreed on a financial accord for Algerian development.

Jan. 20—The Algerian Labor Federation ends its convention. A new executive committee (with ties to Ben Bella) is elected by a show of hands.

Jan. 26—French Minister of Algerian Affairs Jean de Broglie leaves for Paris after a 5-day meeting on French-Algerian differences.

BRAZIL

Jan. 6—Brazilians participate in a national plebiscite. The voters will decide whether to replace the present parliamentary system with a presidential system giving strong power to the executive.

Jan. 7—The U.S. agrees to lend Brazil \$30 million for 90 days. Brazil faces an emergency balance of payments deficit.

Jan. 8—It is reported that President João Goulart's plebiscite to establish strong presidential powers has been successful. The plebiscite resulted in a vote favoring the presidential system.

Jan. 18—The Bank of Brazil and a subsidiary of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company sign an agreement whereby I.T.&T. will be compensated for the expropriation of its properties in the state of Rio Grande do Sul in February, 1962.

Jan. 23—President Goulart forms a new Cabinet. Last night the ministers resigned because the Chamber of Deputies voted to repeal the parliamentary system in favor of a strong president with full executive powers.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Canada

Jan. 21—Parliament resumes.

Jan. 31—Prime Minister John Diefenbaker charges the U.S. with "unwarranted intrusion" into Canadian debate on Canada's acceptance of nuclear arms.

Ceylon

Jan. 10—Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike arrives in New Delhi from Peking on a mission of mediation in the Indo-Chinese border dispute. (See also *India*.)

Great Britain

Jan. 1—Defense Minister Peter Thorneycroft says that Britain plans to maintain an independent nuclear power within the Atlantic alliance.

Jan. 10—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan begins his seventh year in office; this is the longest term for a Conservative since 1902.

Jan. 18—Labor party leader Hugh Gaitskell dies at 56.

Jan. 21—Macmillan says that Europe can become "great and strong enough to build a more equal and worthy partnership" with the U.S. only if Europe achieves "true"

unity. (See also *France*, Jan. 14ff.)

Jan. 23—Britain reveals she will establish diplomatic relations with the Mongolian People's Republic; Britain will be the first major Western power to establish diplomatic relations with this Communist state.

The Conservative government suggests increased payments in social assistance and pensions and unemployment compensation at an initial added cost estimated at \$635.6 million annually.

The parliamentary Labor party agrees to offer the Commons a "no confidence" motion on the Government's decision to build a Polaris submarine nuclear force.

Jan. 28—Peter Thorneycroft reveals that a United Kingdom reserve infantry brigade has been alerted to move to the Far East because of what he terms the "possibility of outside interference" in the British protectorate of Brunei.

Jan. 30—Prime Minister Macmillan tells Commons that Britain needs an independent nuclear deterrent to maintain its position "without fear of nuclear blackmail." He is defending his Nassau agreement with U.S. President Kennedy.

Commons hears a report on the failure of the Brussels negotiations to admit Britain to the Common Market by Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal, who led the British delegation at Brussels.

In a televised speech, Macmillan charges that French President de Gaulle is "trying to dominate Europe."

Jan. 31—Macmillan confers with Danish Premier Jens Otto Krag.

India

Jan. 5—The Indian government reveals that on January 1 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to the Chinese Communists repeating "India's desire for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question" and agreeing to hold "talks and discussion to this end when the latest Chinese aggression since September 8, 1962, is undone."

U.S. defense materials arrive in Bombay. Jan. 9—An authoritative Indian source is

quoted by *The New York Times* to have revealed that a shipment of Soviet MIG jet fighter planes is en route to India.

Jan. 11—Talks begin between Prime Ministers Nehru and Bandaranaike of Ceylon.

Jan. 12—Ali Sabry, President of the United Arab Republic's Executive Council, arrives in New Delhi to join the Nehru-Bandaranaike discussions on a negotiated settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute.

Jan. 13—Nehru agrees to submit suggestions for border negotiations to the Indian Parliament on January 21 when it convenes.

Jan. 16—The second series of discussions on the Kashmir dispute begins in New Delhi.

Jan. 18—Describing the Indian-Pakistani talks as at an "impasse," the Pakistani delegation leader asks the U.S. and Britain to intervene to ask India to alter her position.

Jan. 19—"Procedural proposals" by India rescue the Indian-Pakistani negotiations, which will resume early in February in Karachi.

In Colombo, six Afro-Asian nations ask India to agree to a temporary joint civil administration on a basis of parity between China and India in the Ladakh area. The proposals call for a Chinese withdrawal and Indian reoccupation of some evacuated areas.

Jan. 25—The lower house of the Indian Parliament rejects an opposition resolution calling the Colombo proposals unacceptable; thus tacit approval is given for Nehru's announced plan to accept "in toto" the Colombo proposals for negotiation of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute.

Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs reveals that "in the very near future" Russian specialists will help construct a factory to produce MIG 21 fighter planes in India.

Jan. 29—Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio arrives in New Delhi bringing a "hopeful message" to Nehru from Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai.

Pakistan

Jan. 5—Pakistan and Communist China sign

a trade agreement; its terms and text are not revealed.

Jan. 15—A Pakistani delegation arrives in New Delhi for the second round of talks with India on the Kashmir dispute. (See also *India*, Jan. 16ff.)

BRITISH EMPIRE

Kenya

Jan. 4—On his arrival in Nairobi, Governor Malcolm MacDonald says that the British government will "lose no time" in granting independence to Kenya under an African government. Elections for full internal self-government under an African prime minister will be scheduled "as rapidly as possible."

Jan. 14—Desegregation begins in all but one of Kenya's 28 formerly white or "European" primary schools. The decision was left to the local primary school committees.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Jan. 1—A leading editorial in *Jen Min Jih Pao* (Chinese Communist newspaper), which annually appears as a state of the nation message, declares that Red China will work to promote "the unity of the Socialist camp." (See also *East Germany*.)

Jan. 2—At a banquet in Peking in honor of Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, Communist Chinese Premier Chou En-lai reveals his hopes that India will settle the Sino-Indian border dispute at the conference table. Subandrio is in Peking to discuss the Chinese border conflict with India. (See also *Brit. Comm.*, *India*.)

Jan. 27—An editorial published in *Jen Min Jih Pao* attacks Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and warns that differences within the Communist bloc are at a "critical juncture."

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Jan. 1—President Moise Tshombe sends a message through the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga (Belgian-controlled mining company in secessionist Katanga Province)

urging the U.N. to arrange an immediate cease-fire in Katanga. He declares that he is willing to go to Elisabethville for negotiations, provided his "total freedom" is guaranteed.

Jan. 2—At the U.N. headquarters, a spokesman for Secretary General U Thant declares that Tshombe's request for a meeting with a U.N. representative not presently engaged in the offensive against Katanga has been turned down. The spokesman states that Thant believes "it is now too late for negotiations"; "the only discussions required" center around the implementation of Thant's "national reconciliation" program for the Congo.

Jan. 4—The U.S. government issues a special statement in support of the U.N. The statement warns Tshombe "to end promptly the Katanga secession."

Jan. 5—It is reported that Tshombe is still in Kolwezi, Katanga's last stronghold 200 miles west of Elisabethville.

Ralph Bunche, U.S. under secretary for special political affairs, confers in Leopoldville with U.N. leaders on the Congo situation.

Jan. 7—Premier Cyrille Adoula of the central government appoints Francois Kalala (a civil servant) as head of a temporary "administrative mission" in Katanga. Adoula also orders that Katanganese currency be exchanged for Congolese.

Jan. 8—Tshombe enters Elisabethville. He is driven there by the Belgian consul general.

Jan. 9—It is reported that U.N. officials in Elisabethville have declared that they will not negotiate with Tshombe unless he accepts complete freedom of movement for the U.N. in Katanga.

Jan. 10—A spokesman for Tshombe declares that he has abandoned his threat for a scorched earth policy, and that he will cooperate with the U.N. in opening Katanga to the U.N.

Bunche returns to New York.

Jan. 11—At the U.N., 31 independent African nations vote "full support" for the U.N. operation in the Congo.

Jan. 12—Tshombe arrives in Ndola in Northern Rhodesia from Elisabethville.

Unconfirmed reports from Elisabethville state that Tshombe will give up his last stronghold at Kolwezi to the U.N. if he is guaranteed the role of provincial president.

The U.N. announces that its troops have entered Sakania on the Northern Rhodesian border. The U.N. now controls the rail line from Elisabethville south into the Rhodesias and Mozambique.

Jan. 13—Tshombe arrives in Kolwezi, despite his promise to return to Elisabethville.

Jan. 14—A special mission, composed of Jacques Houard (Belgian consul general in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia) and André van Roey, (director of Katanga's national bank), arrives in Kolwezi to persuade Tshombe to allow the U.N. to enter peacefully.

Jan. 15—President Moise Tshombe announces the end of Katanganese secession and agrees to permit full freedom of movement for U.N. forces. In letters to Premier Adoula and U Thant, Tshombe agrees to U Thant's plan for national reconciliation. Tshombe asks Adoula to sign an amnesty immediately as provided by the Thant plan.

Thant welcomes Tshombe's capitulation. U.N. spokesmen report that a political amnesty has been promised to Tshombe and his followers by the central government.

Jan. 21—Kolwezi is entered by U.N. forces without any violence.

Jan. 25—Premier Adoula in a radio address asks Katanganese gendarmes to surrender their arms and register themselves. All who give themselves up before February 5 will be taken into the Congolese army.

Jan. 28—It is reported that U.N. officials have taken the records of Katanga's national bank. Sources say that the province is bankrupt.

Jan. 29—Tshombe and his ministers meet with Congo Resident Minister Joseph Ileo in Elisabethville, to discuss Katanga's incorporation into the central government.

CUBA

Jan. 2—Cuban Premier Fidel Castro delivers a speech on the fourth anniversary of his revolution. He declares that Cuba can set "an example to the Latin American Revolution and within the Socialist camp. . . ."

Jan. 7—In a statement made at the U.N., Cuba declares her belief that U.S.-Soviet settlement of the Cuban crisis will not effectively maintain peace in the Caribbean.

Jan. 22—Private reports from Havana reveal that weapons and other materials are continuing to flow into Cuba. The Soviet military build-up in Cuba is considered to be in the "defensive weapons" category.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Jan. 4—President-elect Juan Bosch talks with U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Washington on aid for his country.

FRANCE

(See also *West Germany*.)

Jan. 1—President Charles de Gaulle declares that 1963 will witness "the appearance of our atomic force." De Gaulle's statement is interpreted as meaning he will continue to build an independent atomic force despite the U.S. offer to supply Polaris missiles within the Nato alliance.

Jan. 3—In the National Assembly, debate opens on a bill to establish a special court for the security of the state; it will handle politically subversive crimes.

Jan. 4—U.S. Ambassador to France Charles E. Bohlen confers with de Gaulle on the U.S. Polaris missile offer.

Jan. 12—Parliamentary action is completed on the bill for the special court, after the Senate and the Assembly agree on a compromise.

Jan. 14—President de Gaulle, in a news conference, in essence rejects the U.S. proposal to supply Polaris missiles within the North Atlantic Alliance. He reaffirms his determination to build an independent atomic force for France. De Gaulle also suggests that Britain should not seek full membership in the E.E.C. until she cuts her ties

to countries around the world. He advocates "association" status for Britain in the E.E.C.

Jan. 22—President de Gaulle and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, in the Elysee Palace, sign a treaty of cooperation. The treaty provides for closer French-German collaboration on matters of defense, diplomacy and culture. De Gaulle declares that the treaty "opens the doors to a new future for France, Germany and Europe and, consequently, the world." De Gaulle agrees to Adenauer's proposal that the Chairman of the Common Market Commission make a detailed study of the points of agreement and disagreement between Britain and the E.E.C.

It is reported that yesterday Minister of the Armed Forces Pierre Messmer told the National Assembly that by the end of 1963 the first part of France's independent atomic force will be ready. Atomic bombs three times as powerful as the one dropped on Hiroshima will be delivered. Three Mirage IV, twin-jet supersonic light attack bombers will be completed and ready to carry the bombs.

Jan. 23—The National Assembly votes approval of reports supporting an atomic force for France. The approval is given during debate on the 1963 military budget.

Jan. 24—Foreign Minister Couve de Murville tells the National Assembly that negotiations on British entry into the E.E.C. are "without hope." He lists the concessions Britain desires, and the reasons for rejection. Minister of Information Alain Peyrefitte declares that France will study the German proposal for an inquiry into differences between Britain and the E.E.C. Both ministers see no reason for resuming negotiations on Britain's membership.

**GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF (East)**

Jan. 12—East Germany and Cuba agree to set up full diplomatic relations.

Jan. 13—*Neues Deutschland* (Communist party paper) publishes an editorial criticizing Communist China for its ideological

dispute with the Soviet Union. The publication of the editorial coincides with the arrival of the Communist Chinese delegation to the Communist party congress opening soon.

Jan. 14—Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev arrives in East Berlin; he leads the Soviet delegation to the party congress. Khrushchev states that he will not wage a war in any country "to set up a Socialist society," which is an internal matter for the people concerned.

Jan. 15—At the opening of the party congress, East German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht denounces Red China for its attack on India's border areas. A Yugoslav delegation, the first in attendance since the 1948 split, is present.

Jan. 16—Khrushchev calls for a halt to the ideological conflict between China and the Soviet Union. He rejects an all-Communist conference to end the dispute. Khrushchev tells the 4,500 delegates that the Soviet Union has a 100-megaton bomb that could not be used over France or West Germany without devastating East Germany and the U.S.S.R.

Jan. 18—Chinese delegation leader Wu Hsiu-Chuan at the party congress criticizes Yugoslav "revisionism." Wu deplores the fact "that Nehru has been supported by some self-styled Marxist-Leninists." He also suggests that a conference of all Communist leaders be called to iron out the ideological dispute between China and the U.S.S.R.

Jan. 20—Yugoslav delegate Veljko Vlahovic tells the congress that Red China should not attack other Communist parties, but should develop some "worthy achievements" itself.

Jan. 21—The party congress ends.

Jan. 22—Khrushchev departs for Moscow.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Jan. 4—West Germany's representative in West Berlin Felix Von Eckardt discloses that West Germany has offered East Germany a \$100 million credit for a 2-year

period, provided East Germany will permit West Berliners to enter East Berlin.

Jan. 14—U.S. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball confers for 2 hours in Bonn with Adenauer. A West German government spokesman announces that Adenauer has agreed to cooperate in building a multilateral nuclear force within Nato.

West Germany cancels diplomatic ties with Cuba following Cuban recognition of East Germany.

Jan. 16—The opposition Social Democratic party leaders send a letter to Adenauer asking him to use his influence with President de Gaulle to urge British entry into the E.E.C.

Jan. 20—Adenauer arrives in Paris for talks with de Gaulle.

Jan. 23—Adenauer returns to Bonn. He praises the treaty signed yesterday establishing closer ties and cooperation with France. (See *France*, Jan. 22.)

Jan. 25—President Heinrich Lübke states that he hopes that Britain will become a member of the E.E.C.

IRAN

Jan. 27—The Interior Ministry announces the results of a national referendum held earlier this month on the Shah's reform program. The vote was 4.9 million in favor, 3,824 against. The reform laws, passed by decree, include land reform, a new election law, and a profit-sharing plan for workers.

ITALY

Jan. 16—Premier Amintore Fanfani arrives in the U.S. for talks with U.S. leaders.

Jan. 24—The Cabinet approves the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles in Italy; they will be replaced by Polaris missiles based on submarines in the Mediterranean (but not necessarily in Italian waters). The Cabinet also approves the establishment of a multilateral nuclear striking force within Nato, with Italy playing a minor role.

KOREA, SOUTH

Jan. 26—It is reported that negotiations are

under way in Seoul among members of the ruling military junta in a struggle for power. The conflict centers around the charge by some junta members that Brigadier Chong Pil Kim is organizing the new pro-government Democratic Republic party as a personal machine. The Acting President of South Korea and chief of the junta, General Chung Hee Park, ousts 5 members of the 23-member junta (4 were anti-Kim and one was a Kim supporter).

MEXICO

Jan. 7—Leaders of a new group, Independent Campesina Central (leftist, anti-U.S. and anti-Mexico's present government), complete its organization.

PERU

Jan. 5—The military junta suspends constitutional guarantees. The government arrests Communist leaders. The junta issues a communiqué revealing that it has discovered Communist plans for a revolt.

SAUDI ARABIA

Jan. 16—Saudi Arabia and Great Britain agree to resume diplomatic relations, cancelled during the Suez crisis (1956).

SPAIN

Jan. 25—Spain formally asks the U.S. to renegotiate the 1953 mutual defense agreement under which U.S. forces and facilities are maintained in Spain. The treaty expires in September.

Jan. 28—French Minister of the Interior Roger Frey confers with members of the government in Madrid.

SYRIA

Jan. 15—It is reported that the Syrian General Staff has been negotiating for 3 days with Colonel Abdel Kerim Nahlawi, who threatens to seize Damascus. Nahlawi, leader of 2 coups in Syria, demands that the government compromise on its anti-U.A.R. stand.

Jan. 17—It is reported that President Nazim

Kudsi has conferred with Nahlawi and other officers, and talked them out of their threatened coup. Syrian authorities state that Nahlawi and his colleagues will return to their diplomatic assignments abroad.

TOGO

Jan. 13—President Sylvanus Olympio is assassinated during a military coup. Most cabinet ministers are arrested.

Jan. 18—President Nicolas Grunitzky, named to the presidency by the military committee, asks for international recognition for his 2-day old government. Yesterday, a coalition of Togo's 4 political parties formed a provisional government.

U.S.S.R., THE

Jan. 9—Soviet Premier Khrushchev leaves Moscow for the sixth congress of East Germany's Socialist Unity (Communist) party. En route he will stop in Poland to confer with Polish leaders. (See also *East Germany*.)

Jan. 26—It is disclosed that the government's annual economic report shows that workers incomes increased 2 per cent in 1962. Soviet total industrial output equalled 63 per cent of that of the U.S. (versus 47 per cent in 1957.) The rate of industrial growth was 9.5 per cent (compared with 9.2 per cent in 1961).

UNITED STATES

Agriculture

Jan. 31—In a special farm message to Congress, President Kennedy suggests a plan for voluntary production controls.

Civil Rights

Jan. 17—Attorney General Robert Kennedy tells the Supreme Court that state voting systems that discriminate against urban residents strike "at the very heart of American democracy."

Jan. 22—The U.S. Department of Justice brings suit against the state of Mississippi and the County Clerk and Voting Registrar of Sunflower County, Mississippi, to end voting discrimination against Negroes.

The Economy

- Jan. 18—The Department of Commerce reports that total income payments to individuals rose in 1962 by 6 per cent to a record \$440,500,000,000.
- Jan. 21—In his annual economic report to Congress, President Kennedy foresees “continued moderate expansion” of the national economy, and explains the need for tax reduction and reform.
- Jan. 24—President Kennedy gives Congress a 3-year plan for tax reduction and reform, cutting personal and corporate tax rates by \$13.64 billion and reducing allowable itemized deductions.
- Jan. 30—Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz tells a joint economic committee of Congress that the nation’s unemployment rate is 12 per cent for young people, racial minorities and the unskilled.

Foreign Policy

- Jan. 7—In a joint letter to U.N. Secretary General U Thant, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. declare they consider the Cuban crisis ended; they express hope for the “adjustment of other differences between them.”
- Jan. 16—The White House reveals that the President plans to visit Italy later in 1963.
- Jan. 17—Two days of “cordial and constructive conversations” between the President and Italian Premier Amintore Fanfani are concluded; the replacement of U.S. missile bases in Italy by Polaris missile submarines in the Mediterranean has been discussed. (See also *Italy*.)
- Jan. 18—The White House reports that the President will visit West German Chancellor Adenauer after his visit to Italy in May or June.
- Jan. 20—It is reported in Washington that the Turkish government has responded favorably to U.S. suggestions that its missile bases in Turkey should be replaced by Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean.
- Jan. 24—Christian Herter arrives in Brussels to begin negotiations with the Common Market on tariff reduction; Herter is Presi-

dent Kennedy’s special representative for trade negotiations.

- Jan. 28—The Department of Defense notes that Britain will be expected to share the development costs of advanced Polaris missiles it may buy from the U.S.

Government

- Jan. 1—Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma dies.
- Jan. 7—Higher postal rates go into effect; a first class letter now requires a five cent stamp.
- Jan. 9—The 88th Congress convenes.
- Jan. 14—President Kennedy delivers the State of the Union message to Congress; he asks for a 3-year tax reduction and reform program.
- Jan. 17—The President sends a \$98.8 billion budget for fiscal 1964 to Congress; revenue is estimated at a record \$86.9 billion; the deficit would total some \$11.9.
- Jan. 28—Dr. Ellen Black Winston, formerly North Carolina Commissioner of Welfare, becomes the first federal Commissioner of Welfare. The national social security system continues to be managed by Commissioner Robert M. Ball, who formerly was in charge of both the welfare and the social security programs.
- Jan. 29—The President asks Congress for a single bill that would give the nation’s schools and colleges \$1.215 billion in federal funds in fiscal 1964.

Labor

- Jan. 11—A Board of Public Accountability reports that chief responsibility for the 35-day old New York newspaper strike rests with the striking International Typographical Union.
- Jan. 22—Federal settlement terms are accepted by maritime employers after a 31-day longshore strike.
- Jan. 25—The end of the 34-day maritime strike is ordered by officials of the International Longshoremen’s Association.

Military Policy

- Jan. 17—The President calls for \$51 billion

in military expenditures for fiscal 1964. (See also *Government*, Jan. 17.)

Jan. 24—The Administration reveals that U.S. military satellites and Soviet satellites in orbit will no longer be publicly listed in the "satellite situation" report by its Space Agency's Goddard Space Flight Center.

Jan. 26—The President reveals he has ordered underground nuclear tests suspended during the current test ban negotiations.

Jan. 30—The Atomic Energy Commission says its underground test program in Nevada is "quite successful" in new weapons development.

Segregation

Jan. 7—James Meredith, the only Negro student at the University of Mississippi, says that he may not return to the University for the second semester.

Jan. 11—Attorney General Robert Kennedy is asked by members of the faculty not to remove the 300-man military guard from James Meredith at the University of Mississippi. The resolution was signed by the local chapter of the American Association of University Professors.

A white student is suspended and a new, stern disciplinary policy is introduced at the University of Mississippi after continuing demonstrations against Meredith.

Jan. 16—The formerly all-white Clemson College of South Carolina is ordered by a federal court to admit a Negro student; South Carolina is the only state that has not made even a token effort to integrate the races in any school.

Jan. 18—Governor Terry Sanford of North Carolina reveals he is forming a bi-racial panel to work toward ending discrimination against Negroes in employment.

Jan. 28—Clemson College enrolls its first Negro student without incident.

Jan. 30—James Meredith says he will continue studying at the University of Mississippi.

Jan. 31—A second Negro applicant, Dewey

Greene Jr., is rejected as unqualified by the University of Mississippi.

Supreme Court

Jan. 14—The court rules 6 to 3 that a Virginia statute which makes it a crime to solicit legal business and therefore restricts the activities of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is an unconstitutional restriction of the free speech and free association of the N.A.A.C.P. and its members.

Jan. 21—Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas contend that the Supreme Court may be violating the Constitution when it sets up rules of procedure for the federal courts because some of the rules are "in practical effect the equivalent of" legislation.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Jan. 2—Five U.S. helicopters are brought down by guerrilla fire in the Mekong delta. Three Americans are killed.

Jan. 3—The Viet Cong (Pro-Communist rebel guerrillas) depart from the Mekong delta after winning a large victory.

Jan. 5—The U.S. Department of Defense announces that helicopters will continue to be used in transporting Vietnamese troops.

YEMEN

Jan. 3—It is reported that the U.S. has sent a note to the U.A.R. protesting attacks recently on Saudi Arabian territory by U.A.R. planes involved in the fighting in Yemen.

Jan. 4—U.A.R. sources declare that Saudi Arabian Premier Feisal is building up forces on the North Yemen frontier in support of the royalist cause. Hence some 15,000 U.A.R. forces cannot be removed from Yemen.

YUGOSLAVIA

Jan. 28—A Yugoslav radio broadcast reports a speech by President Tito criticizing the Chinese Communists. (See also *East Germany*.)

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